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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - JUVENILE ADJUDICATORY HEARINGS
REASONABLE-DOUBT STANDARD HELD As DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT.
In re Winship (U.S. 1969)
Appellant was adjudicated a delinquent in 1967 by the New York
Family Court during a hearing conducted pursuant to section 742 of the
New York Family Court Act.' The youth, a twelve year old boy, had
been charged with purloining $112 from a woman's pocketbook located
in a locker. The appellant was by statutory definition a juvenile, 2 subject
to the provisions of the Act. The petition filed against the minor alleged
the commission of an act which "if done by an adult, would constitute the
crime or crimes of larceny."3 Although acknowledging that the evidence
might not suffice to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the pre-
siding judge rejected appellant's argument that such a degree of proof
was required under the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the decision was
made under section 744(b) of the Act which provided for an adjudica-
tion of delinquency based upon a preponderance of the evidence.4 At the
subsequent dispositional hearing appellant was ordered to be placed in
a training school for a minimum of eighteen months with the provision
for annual extensions of such commitment up to his eighteenth birthday.5
The adjudication was sustained initially by the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court, First Judicial District,6 and finally by the
New York Court of Appeals. 7
On appeal, the Supreme Court, reversed, holding first, that due
process requires the application of the reasonable-doubt standard in all
adult criminal trials and secondly, that this procedural right extends to
all juvenile adjudicatory hearings in which a minor is charged with an
act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Recognition of the need for imposing a higher burden of proof in
criminal matters has ancient roots. Although the specific origin is un-
1. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 742 (McKinney 1963) [hereinafter cited as ACT].
2. N.Y. FAMILY CT. AT § 712 (McKinney 1963), defines a juvenile delinquent
as "a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which,
if done by an adult, would constitute a crime."
3. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 360 (1970).
4. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 744(b) (McKinney 1963).
5. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 756(b) (McKinney 1963), provides one of the
alternatives for the judge at the disposition hearing, authorizing placements for the
initial period up to eighteen months with provision for one year extensions successively
up to the child's eighteenth birthday.
6. 291 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (affirmed without opinion).
7. 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1969). The court affirmed,
four to three, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of section 744b of the ACT.
(352)
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certain, it dates back to at least the fourth century A.D." Since our early
colonial period the concept of a presumption of innocence of criminal
charges has been recognized as essential in a society that prizes the good
name and liberty of the individual.9 However, the crystallization of the
reasonable-doubt standard as the measure of the weight of evidence suf-
ficient to rebut the presumption in favor of the defendant did not appear
until approximately the end of the eighteenth century. It was expressed
in a treason prosecution in Dublin in 1798 and reported thus:
It may also at this day, be considered as a rule of law, that, if the
jury entertain a reasonable doubt ... they are bound (to acquit),1O
By the middle of the nineteenth century the reasonable-doubt test was
well defined by our courts and most succinctly expressed by Chief Justice
Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Court as follows:
The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions
of law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every
person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon
such proof there is a reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is en-
titled to the benefit of it by an acquittal."
Although the Supreme Court prior to In re Winship had not directly
considered the issue of the applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard
as a constitutional requirement in adult criminal proceedings,12 many of
its earlier opinions had suggested that a criminal defendant faced with
a possible loss of liberty was entitled to such protection as an element of
due process. 13 Also, antecedent to Winship the reasonable-doubt stand-
ard enjoyed universal application in adult criminal cases in all fifty states
either by statute or judicial fiat. 1 4 Thus, the Court's express determina-
tion in Winship that the reasonable-doubt standard is a procedural safe-
guard of "constitutional stature"'15 is little more than an affirmation of
8. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
558 (1898), quoting a passage from CORPUS JURIS.
9. Id. at 553-54. Thayer quotes the General Court (the Legislature) of Massa-
chusetts from 1657, Records of Massachusetts:
In criminal prosecutions the presumption is in favor of the defendant, for
thus far it is to be hoped of all mankind, that they are not guilty in any such
instances, and the penalty enhances the presumption.
10. May, Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 AM. L. REV. 642,
656-57 (1876).
11. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850).
12. See Michael & Cunningham, From Gault to Urbasek: For the Young The
Best of Both Worlds, 49 CHI. B. RECORD 162, 166 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) ; Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954) ; Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) ; Wilson v. United States, 232
U.S. 563, 569-70 (1914) ; Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910) ; Davis v.
United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895) ; Miles v. United States, 103 US. 304, 312(1880). Cf. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 433 (1895).
14. See 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 910 n.93 (1961 with 1970 Supp.) for authority
in all states except Nevada and Hawaii; and HAWAII REV. LAWS § 705-2 (1955)
NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.191-92 (1967).
15. 397 U.S. at 364, where the Court stated:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the ac-
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that which formerly had been implicit in numerous decisions. Consider-
ing the catholic acceptance of this standard, the impact of Winship upon
criminal prosecutions will be negligible.
In the area of juvenile law, however, the Supreme Court had not
previously lent its consideration to the standard of proof issue, although
the landmark cases of Kent v. United StatesI6 and In re Gault 7 had
opened the door to certain procedural due process protections.,' In
Gault the Court provided that a juvenile faced with possible incarcera-
tion, is constitutionally entitled at an adjudicatory hearing19 to those pro-
tections which are deemed "essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment.' '20 It is upon this criterion of the essential elements concept that
the Court in Winship based its decision that the reasonable-doubt stand-
ard is among the constitutional rights of a minor accused of an act which
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.
cused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
16. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
17. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For discussion treating Kent and Gault from various
postures, see Croxton, Kent Case and Its Consequence, 7 J. FAM. L. 1 (1967);
Ketcham, Guidelines From Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal, 53
VA. L. REV. 1700 (1967); Michael & Cunningham, supra note 12.
18. See Forer, Rights of Children: The Legal Vacuum, 55 A.B.A.J. 1151 (1969),
where the author stated:
Although the United States Supreme Court passes on some 2,500 cases a year
and decides on the merits approximately 400 cases a year, it was not until 177 years
after the founding of this nation that the Court ruled on a case raising the con-
stitutional rights of a child.
19. Glen, Bifurcated Hearings in the Juvenile Court, 16 CRIME AND DELIN. 255,
256 (1970), defines an adjudicatory hearing, as distinguished from a dispositional
hearing, as follows:
The adjudicatory hearing is a proceeding by a juvenile court judge or other
judicial officer at which the court determines whether it has jurisdiction to hear the
case and whether the person before the court committed the acts alleged. These
allegations must be contained in a petition, a sworn document that states with
particularity the time, date, place, and circumstances of either a violation of law
or behavior defined as a violation of the juvenile court law. Notice of these alle-
gations must be served on the parties involved, generally a child and his parents,
guardian, or custodian; the most effective notice is a copy of the petition.
After a hearing that meets the requirements of procedural due process, the
court must decide whether the child has committed the acts or has been found in
the condition alleged in the petition (footnote omitted).
Glen notes that this explication of the adjudicatory stage conforms with that advocated
by the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, and is required in several
recent juvenile court act revisions, including the New York Family Court Act, as
well as being the system required by the NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELIN-
QUENCY, STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT (1959). Id. at 255-56.
By way of distinction Glen defines the dispositional hearing as:
[A] judicial proceeding in which the judge, with the aid of a social study re-
port . . . prepared by staff responsible to the court, decides what measure of the
state's coercive power, within the alternatives authorized by law, will be applied
to the child.
Id. at 258.
20. 387 U.S. at 30. The specific safeguards accorded juveniles in such circum-
stances were the right to (1) notice to parent and child sufficient to enable preparation
of defense, (2) a statement of the charge alleged with specificity, (3) an apprising of
both parent and child of the right to counsel, and the availability of free counsel where
the parent cannot afford the expense, (4) to be advised of the right to remain silent
and the privilege against self-incrimination, and (5) the right to confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses. Id. at 31-59.
[VOL. 16
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The Court first examined the consequences of a guilty verdict in an
adult criminal trial, and noted two interests of "immense importance"
to the individual accused which are jeopardized in such proceedings -
liberty and reputation. Recognizing the constant presence of a margin
of error whenever facts are in dispute, the Court decided that a society
which prizes the freedom and good name of an individual must, in order
to protect such personal interests, reduce the possibility of erroneous con-
victions by prohibiting a guilty verdict where there exists a reasonable
doubt.21
Focusing next upon delinquency adjudications, the Court found that
the same individual interests are at stake. Nomenclature and worthy
intentions do not suffice to supplant the harsh realities of the juvenile
system of purported protection and rehabilitation. The "civil" label and
the design of reform rather than retribution do not obviate the need for
due process protections. Quoting from the Gault opinion, the Court
reiterated that a "proceeding where the issue is whether the child will
be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years
is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. '22
The basis for this indictment of existing juvenile reform programs
was set forth by Mr. Justice Fortas in Kent who, while noting the laudi-
ble purposes of the juvenile system, cited the growing number of studies
and critiques which found the system's rehabilitative effectiveness to be
tenuous due to inadequate personnel, facilities and techniques.23 These
findings were relied upon in the instant case. The Court reasoned that
since the child may well be deprived of the identical critical interests
in the adjudicatory hearing as an adult in a criminal proceeding, in the
absence of the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
juveniles, the same balancing of values is equally applicable. The majority
concluded that the constant danger of factual error, the correlation of the
standard of proof to the frequency of such error,24 and the magnitude of
the individual's interests in jeopardy in both criminal trials and juvenile
adjudicatory proceedings dictate the imposition of the reasonable-doubt
standard as opposed to some lesser burden of proof.
In expanding the limits of the procedural rights of juveniles during
the adjudicatory stage to include the application of the reasonable-doubt
21. 397 U.S. at 363.
22. Id. at 366, citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
23. 383 U.S. at 555-56.
24. Mr. Justice Harlan noted in his concurring opinion that:
If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance
of the evidence rather than nroof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a
smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but a greater
risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent. Because the standard
of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous out-
comes, the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation
should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social dis-
utility of each.
397 U.S. at 371.
DECEMBER 1970]
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standard, the majority deemed the argument advanced by the prosecu-
tion and supported by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Burger - that such would adversely affect the beneficial substantive
elements peculiar to the juvenile system 25 - to be untenable. The effect
of adding the reasonable-doubt standard to existing procedural rights
guaranteed to the juvenile does not seem to warrant the concern ex-
pressed by the dissent since the opinion in Winship, as in Gault, is con-
fined to considerations at the adjudicatory stage,26 thus leaving the pre-
judicial and dispositional stages free from express constraint on the
potential to employ the personalized methods best suited toward the in-
dividual problem.27
It is not suggested however, that the implementation of the reasonable-
doubt standard will have no effect upon the juvenile system. It is fore-
seeable that certain aspects of the juvenile process will experience some
change. Conceivably Winship will promote a heightened air of formality
at adjudicatory hearings, since the use of the reasonable-doubt test will
foster a more adversarial proceeding. This result seems inevitable to the
extent that counsel for defense and the prosecution strive to evidence or
disprove the existence of the dispositive reasonable-doubt. However,
recent studies have indicated that an increase in the formality of juvenile
proceedings would be more apt to engender positive rather than detri-
mental effects in a juvenile by impressing upon him the firm yet fair
manner in which his situation is handled. 28
25. 397 U.S. at 375-76. Mr. Justice Stewart joined in this dissent in which the
Chief Justice expressed fear that the majority opinion was another step in the
progression taken by the Supreme Court toward returning juveniles to the jurisdiction
of criminal courts.
26. 397 U.S. at 359; 387 U.S. at 13.
27. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 548 (1957),
stated the goal of the juvenile system as follows:
The aim throughout is individualized treatment according to the seriousness
of the act; redemption not retaliation. The care offered the child, in the words
of the first Juvenile Court Act, "shall approximate as nearly as may be that which
should be given by its parents."
28. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967), where it is
stated that:
[Tihere is increasing evidence that the informal procedures, contrary to the
original expectation, may themselves constitute a further obstacle to effective
treatment . . . to the extent that they engender in the child a sense of injustice
provoked by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of authority by
judges and probation officers.
Id. at 85. See also Handler, The Juvenile Court and The Adversary System: Problems
of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, where the author states:
[Wihat little there is published on the subject indicates that the impact is pre-
cisely opposite to that intended. Instead of producing attitudes of rapport and
trust (considered necessary for rehabilitation), the high degree of informality
leads to confusion and lack of perception or understanding of roles and standards.
In the eyes of the adolescent and the parent the officials seem all-powerful. Their
decisions are completely personal and can turn on whim, anger or friendliness.
Id. at 19. See also Grygier, The Concept of "The State of Delinquency" - An
Obituary, 18 J. LEG. ED. 131 (1965) ; Studt, The Client's Image of the Juvenile Court,
in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 200 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
[VOL. 16
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The thrust of the imposition of the reasonable-doubt standard may
well extend beyond the adjudicatory hearing to both the pre and post-
adjudicatory stages. An increase in the incidence of juvenile cases
disposed of prior to adjudication for want of evidence sufficient to meet
the greater burden of proof is not improbable and might occur at various
stages29 where consideration is given to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the allegations. Two "screening" stages, found in all juris-
dictions, in which juvenile cases might be disposed of for want of suf-
ficient evidence are police investigation and the intake process.
There are several dispositional alternatives available to the police
ranging from outright release to referral to a juvenile court, with or
without detention.30 Although the police do not make detailed determi-
nations on the merits they must give some consideration to the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain and justify the petition of charges to be for-
warded to the court.3 1 It is doubtful, however, that any significant
change will occur in police procedures as consideration of the substantive
merits of a case generally go no further than a finding of probable cause.
The intake aspect of the pre-adjudicatory stage includes all of the
processes of the court from the time of arrest and referral until the peti-
tion for formal adjudication is filed.3 2 The court intake worker, who
is usually an experienced member of the court's probation staff,38 has the
responsibility for conducting a detention hearing and ultimately deciding
if the petition for court hearing should be filed.3 4 While a myriad of
considerations enter into this decision, one of these is the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the allegations.3 5 Furthermore, in certain juris-
29. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 78-88 (1957), for a dis-
cussion of the function of these various stages in the juvenile system, the strengths
and weaknesses of each level, and proposals for reform.
30. Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices, and
the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. REV. 567, 573 (1969), sets forth seven possible
alternatives resorted to by police departments in this country:
The seven ways police can deal with arrested juveniles, in order of increasing
severity, are: (1) release; (2) release accompanied by an official report describ-
ing the encounter with the juvenile; (3) an official "reprimand" with release to
parent or guardian; (4) referral to other agencies when it is believed that some
rehabilitative program should be set up after more investigation; (5) voluntary
police supervision used when it is felt that an officer and parent can assist a child
cooperatively; (6) referral to the juvenile court without detention; and (7)
referral to the juvenile court with detention.
31. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 638 (1966).
32. For a discussion of the function and process of intake in the juvenile court
system, see Comment, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Intake Processes,
13 ST. Louis L.J. 69 (1968).
33. Schinitsky, The Practice of Law in the New York Family Court, 17 Juv. CT.
JJ. J. 125, 126 (1967).
34. Comment, supra note 32, at 86.
35. Sheridan, Juvenile Court Intake, 2 J. FAM. L. 139, 142 (1962). However, it
is noted by Waalkes, Juvenile Court Intake - A Unique and Valuable Tool, 10
CRIME AND DELIN. 117, 119 (1964), that although the officer should determine if there
is evidence to support the allegation, he should avoid trying the case on its merits.
DECEMBER 1970]
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1970], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss2/4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
dictions a judge of the juvenile court presides over detention or pre-
adjudicatory hearings at which the substantive sufficiency of the petition
is considered.86 During this judicial pre-adjudicatory "screening" the
opportunity exists for an alternative disposition of a case when there is
insufficient evidence to support the reasonable-doubt standard of proof.
Coupled with the foregoing considerations is the further pre-adjudi-
catory consequence that more thorough investigations might ensue in
efforts to support the substantive case against a minorY7 However, the
advent of increased pre-adjudicatory dispositions and more intensive
investigations would not be repugnant to the pragmatic goals which
should inhere in our juvenile system. On this point the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement noted:
First, efforts to help and heal and treat, if they are to have any
chance of success, must be based upon an accurate determination of
the facts. . . . The essential attributes of a judicial trial are the best
guarantee our system has been able to devise for assuring reliable
determinations of fact.
Second, we are committed to the value of individual self-
determination and freedom. The fact that the State's motives are
beneficent and designed to provide what, at least in its view, the
child and its parents need, should not be allowed to obscure the fact
that in taking a child from his parents or placing him in an institu-
tion or even subjecting him to probation and supervision, the State
is invoking its power to interfere with the lives of individuals as
they choose to lead them. 8
The post-adjudicatory impact of the implementation of the reasonable-
doubt standard is the possibility of an increased incidence of appeals. 39
While any suggestion of the extent of such proliferation would be mere
speculation, it seems safe to assume that counsel will be more apt to test
the merits of an adjudication where a reasonable doubt is sufficient to
36. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
YOUTH CRIME 9-22 (1967).
37. This investigation refers to discovery of facts relating to the occurrence of
the specific act or conduct in question. It should be noted that the juvenile system
involves another type of investigation, which is concerned with the child's social,
psychological, family and economic background for the purpose of aiding in the selec-.
tion of the appropriate rehabilitative method, should rehabilitation be found necessary.
38. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 85 (1967).
39. Since the decision in Winshlo the New York Family Court, Kings County,
has ruled that the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile adjudications
is fundamental to due process, going to the very integrity of the fact-finding process
and the fairness of the trial. As such, the protection must be given retroactive effect
so that a child already adjudged delinquent prior to the Winship decision is entitled
to a new hearing if the availability of appeal has not been exhausted and the time for
certiorari has not elapsed. Moreover, even if these avenues of redress are closed, if
the child is incarcerated and a habeas corpus proceeding has commenced, the juvenile
may be awarded a new hearing. In re S, 63 Misc. 2d 253 (1970), 311 N.Y.S.2d 927(Fam. Ct. Kings County 1970).
[VOL. 16
7
Editors: Recent Developments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
reverse a delinquency finding.40 Althought this would further add to the
formality and adversarial nature of juvenile proceedings, those same
contentions noted earlier 4 1 in regard to the effect of the reasonable-doubt
standard on the adjudicatory hearing seem equally viable here.
Beyond these immediate effects upon the juvenile system it is
arguable that the Winship decision may be a precursor to the creation of
a juvenile's right to a jury trial in those adjudications where the minor
stands accused of acts which would be criminal if committed by an adult.
4 2
This possibility arises from the Court's reasoning that the reasonable-
doubt standard is an essential of due process.
In applying a rationale similar to that employed in Duncan v.
Louisiana3 - that the possible duration of imprisonment attending the
charge of a "serious crime" requires that the accused be afforded a funda-
mental due process right to a jury trial 44 the Winship Court equated the
onerous consequences incumbent upon a delinquency adjudication to
those flowing from a conviction of guilt in a c~iminal trial.4 5 Therefore,
since the standard of proof must be equally high for juveniles as adults
to reduce the possibility of factual errors leading to incarcerations, it
may be argued that the right to have a jury determine whether the
reasonable-doubt standard has been met must also apply to juveniles. 4 6
By restricting the application of the reasonable-doubt standard to
hearings determinative of delinquency based upon an alleged act which,
if perpetrated by an adult, would constitute a crime,4 7 the Winship Court
40. Of course an essential element for any meaningful appeal is a transcript of
the lower court proceedings. At present, certain states provide either by statute, rule
or judicial decision for the recording of such proceedings, and at least one case has
held that an indigent must be furnished a transcript without cost in juvenile pro-
ceedings. See OHIO STATE LEGAL SERVICES ASSOcIATION, COURSE ON LAW AND
POVERTY: THE MINOR at 8.07 (1968). However, there is no juvenile equivalent to
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), which provides for the furnishing of a transcript
to an indigent criminal defendant whenever one would be obtainable by a defendant
of means.
41. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
42. For a discussion espousing the position favoring juvenile jury trials, see
Comment, Juveniles and Their Right to a Jury Trial, 15 VILL. L. REV. 972 (1970).
43. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
44. 391 U.S. at 161-62. The Court stated:
It is sufficient for our purposes to hold that a crime punishable by two years
in prison is . . .a serious crime....
It should be noted that Duncan was charged with simple battery, a misdemeanor,
punishable by a maximum of two years, although the lower court had levied only
sixty days.
45. 397 U.S. at 365-66.
46. The issue of whether a juvenile has a constitutional right to a jury trial was
recently before the Supreme Court in DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
However, following Duncan, the Court in Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 63 (1968),
had ruled that the right to jury trial applied only prospectively. Therefore, since the
hearing in DeBacker had commenced on March 28, 1968, and the Duncan decision
was not handed down until May 20, 1968, the Court on the basis of prospective
application chose not to consider the jury trial issue.
It is worthy to note, however, that the lower court held in a four to three
decision in favor of jury trial, although the Nebraska constitution required at least
the vote of five judges to overturn a statute. 183 Neb. 461, 16 N.W.2d 508 (1968).
47. 397 U.S. at 359.
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has left open a wide area for delinquency adjudications which may be
based upon a quantum of evidence falling short of the reasonable-doubt
standard. There are presently numerous states which provide for adjudi-
cation and commitment on the basis of conduct which indicates mere
propensity toward possible future criminal acts,48 or for acts which are
illegal solely for juveniles such as curfew violations. 49 Both of these
grounds for commitment - status determinations and specific acts pro-
scribed only for juveniles - are beyond the scope of protection accorded
minors by Winship. The New York Family Court Act itself defines a
"person in need of supervision" as a male under sixteen or a female
under eighteen years of age who is "an habitual truant or who is in-
corrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the con-
trol of the parent or other lawful authority." 50 Furthermore, the Act
provides for the very same "placing" of a child adjudged to be within
such a status as was meted out in Winship following the delinquency
adjudication. 5' One stud)9of the incidence of prosecutions and commit-
ments to institutions for adjudications based upon such status determi-
nations or acts illegal only for minors indicates that they are abundant.5 2
The continued existence of these avenues for committing minors to
institutions that are little more than penal in fact63 seems to squarely
48. Examples of such language used to define delinquency are: (1) New Jersey -
"incorrigibility," "immorality" or "growing up in idleness or delinquency," N.J. REV.
STAT. § 2A:4-14(f), (g), (i) (1969); (2) Maine - "behaving in an incorrigible or
indecent and lascivious manner" or "living in circumstances of manifest danger of
falling into habits of vice or immorality," ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2552 (1964) ;
and (3) Florida - "a child in need of supervision" is one who is "growing up in
idleness or crime," FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 12(a) (Supp. 1970). For similar statu-
tory language, see IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3204 (16) (Supp. 1967) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (1965) ; MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 712 A. 2(a) (3), (5) (1968) ;
NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.090(12), (13) (1967) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-08(1) (c)(1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-3(G)(3) (1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 13.04.010(8) (1962) ; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-41(1) (1957).
49. Other examples of acts tolerated for adults but objectionable for children
include smoking, drinking, using vulgar language and frequenting bars or associating
with gamblers or felons. See generally discussion in Paulsen, The Delinquency,
Neglect, and Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE
CHILD 44 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
50. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 712(b) (McKinney 1963).
51. See note 5 supra which states the term of "placement" authorized by section
756(b) for delinquents pursuant to sections 753(b) and 754(c) for children "in need
of supervision."
52. It has been noted that juvenile records across the nation evidence the fact
that over twenty-five percent of the juveniles brought before the courts are alleged to
have violated laws peculiar to minors such as curfew regulations, and children
designated as "ungovernable," "incorrigible," or "in need of supervision." See THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 4 (1967).
53. Mr. Justice Fortas stated in Gault that:
It is of no constitutional consequence - and of limited practical meaning - that
the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact
of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an
"industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child
is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a building of
whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours. . . ." Instead of
mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world
is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents" confined with
him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide (footnotes omitted).
387 U.S. at 27.
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conflict with the Winship rationale. If youths accused of acts tantamount
to adult crimes are not to be deprived of their liberty absent proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, it is anomolous that a child accused of a less serious
offense, or a minor merely considered to be flirting with future acts of
crime, may be incarcerated without equivalent protections. While status
determinations such as "incorrigible" or "ungovernable" do not lend them-
selves to the application of a precise evidentiary test they do nonethe-
less subject the juvenile to extreme potential for judicial abuse, uneven
application of statutory provisions and the very same consequences as
minors adjudged delinquent for acts which would be criminal if committed
by an adult.54  These considerations coupled with the logic expressed
by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Winship in which
he suggests that the choice of a standard of proof should reflect a com-
parison of the social disutilities related to freeing criminals and imprison-
ing the innocent provide a formidable argument for the abolition of these
status determinations.5 5 Adjudicatory hearings concerning allegations of
specific acts illegal solely for juveniles, on the other hand, are conducive
to the use of an evidentiary standard, and there appears to be no rational
basis for not imposing the reasonable-doubt test to any such proceed-
ings wherein the loss of personal freedom may be involved. A presi-
dential task force has suggested an alternate and more drastic approach
on this point by encouraging consideration of complete elimination of
court jurisdiction over conduct illegal only for children.5 6
While various consequences of the Winship decision are not yet
certain, there is one point which is now clear; Gault was not the terminal
point for due process safeguards for juveniles. Although the direction
of future inroads upon juvenile rights is presently conjectural, it is ap-
parent that so long as the system for juvenile reform and rehabilitation
is viewed by the majority of the Court with the same jaundiced eye re-
54. Recently the Supreme Court had an opportunity to dispose of such a case but
refused. In Mattiello v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 963 (1968), the Court noted probablejurisdiction over a matter involving a seventeen year old girl sentenced to a Con-
necticut State Farm for Women until reaching the age of twenty-one on a charge of
being "in manifest danger of falling into habits of vice," in violation of a Connecticut
statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-379 (1960). However, following argument the
Court dismissed the petition for want of a properly presented federal question. 395
U.S. 209 (1969).
55. See note 24 supra. It was argued almost a quarter century ago by Professor
Tappan that such judicial conclusions should not be permitted. He stated that:
The law may not (aside from such special situations as attempts and con-
spiracy . . .) impose anticipatory control upon the individual who has not yet
offended against it .... It cannot without grave injustices prevent the first offense
through efforts at personality diagnosis and treatment. . . . Preventive work may
be done best by home, neighborhood and church or, in their failure, by social
agencies especially designed for familial, financial, occupational, medical, psychi-
atric, and other therapy. Where all of these fail, as evidenced by specific overt
misconduct violative of the law, the courts for delinquency must be resorted to....
Tappan, The Adolescent in Court, 37 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 216, 227-28 (1946).
56. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 27(1967).
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flected by Mr. Justice Fortas in Gault,57 the advocates of juvenile rights
espousing such protections as jury trial, the invalidity of vague "catchall"
statutes, suppression of evidence under the fourth amendment, the right
to speedy adjudication and the protection against double jeopardy will
be receiving more support for their positions. In the absence of reforms
sufficient to satisfy the judiciary that children, channelled into the re-
habilitative process, will receive the care and attention reasonably cal-
culated to instill and nurture the desired attitudes of respect for and
responsibility toward themselves and society, continued expansion of due
process safeguards applied to juveniles is not unlikely.
Richard P.. McBride
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - JUVENILE CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE - PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT RULED THAT A JUVENILE
DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.
In re Terry (Pa. 1970)
In separate proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Branch, Philadelphia County, defendants Terry and McKeiver were ad-
judged to be juvenile delinquents. Edward Terry' had been arrested by
a police officer who identified him as one of two youths observing a fight
who, when the officer tried to break up the fight, hit him. He was found
to be delinquent on the charges of assault, battery and conspiracy.2
Joseph McKeiver,3 identified as one of some twenty or thirty youths who
allegedly stole twenty-five cents from three teenagers, was charged with
robbery, larceny and receiving stolen goods and was found to be a "de-
linquent child."'4
57. See note 53 supra.
I. Terry, who ran from the police officer, was arrested the day following the
fight. He testified that at the time of his arrest he was beaten by the officer. After
the finding of delinquency he was committed to the Youth Development Center at
Cornwall Heights. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350, prob. juris, noted, sub nom.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 399 U.S. 925 (1970).
2. Brief for Appellee at 2, In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
3. When McKeiver's case was called for trial, his counsel had to inform the
court that he could not proceed with the case since he did not have an opportunity
to discuss the case with his client. Counsel was granted five minutes to talk with
McKeiver and then the trial continued. After "weak" testimony by the alleged victims,
McKeiver's counsel argued that the facts had not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. After McKeiver was found to be delinquent, he was placed on probation.
In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
4. McKeiver was sixteen years of age and therefore deemed to be a "child"
under Pennsylvania Law. PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 243 (1965), states in pertinent part:
(2) The word "child," as used in this act, means a minor under the age of
eighteen years.
(4) The words "delinquent child" include:
(a) A child who has violated any law of the Commonwealth or ordinance
of any city, borough or township.
[VOL. 16
11
Editors: Recent Developments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
At the hearing for each youth, counsel's request for a jury trial was
denied. 5 Each appealed, 6 and the Superior Court affirmed. 7 In a consoli-
dated appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the single
question of whether a juvenile has a constitutional right to a jury trial.
It held that the juvenile courts in the Commonwealth are not constitu-
tionally compelled to grant juvenile delinquents the right to a jury trial
where the adjudicatory hearing contains the following seven procedural
safeguards: (1) timely notice of the charges; (2) benefit of counsel; (3)
confrontation of witnesses against the accused; (4) protection against
self-incrimination; (5) the provision of a transcript of the hearing; (6)
appellate review; and (7) the proof of all allegations beyond a reason-
able doubt. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A. 2d 350 (1970).
Separate court systems for adults and juveniles have not always
been known to our scheme of ordered liberty. At common law, a child
over the age of seven could be tried in a criminal case, convicted, and
punished as an adult.8 This remained the accepted practice in the United
States until the latter part of the nineteenth century9 when there occurred
a gradual evolution in the philosophy of youth rehabilitation. The general
thesis of this philosophy is that instead of criminal punishment, a con-
victed child should be diagnosed, treated, and reformed by the state
acting under its power of parens patriae,10 with the ultimate goal of re-
turning the reformed youth to society as a normal citizen."
5. In Pennsylvania the juvenile's right to a jury trial is expressly denied by
statute. The statute states in part:
Except as hereinafter provided, the court shall hear and determine all cases affect-
ing children arising under the provisions of this act without a jury.
PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 247 (1965).
6. Where errors of law or fact are alleged, the delinquent child has the right of
review and rehearing from which an appeal may be taken to the Superior Court.
PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 257 (1965).
7. McKeiver Appeal, 215 Pa. Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921 (1969) ; Terry Appeal,
215 Pa. Super. 762, 255 A,2d 922 (1969).
8. Prior to the age of seven, a presumption of criminal incapacity was irre-
buttable. If the child was between the ages of seven to fourteen, the presumption
was rebuttable. This presumption was removed at fourteen. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAl.
LAW 729-30 (1957). This common law presumption was statutorily changed by the
legislatures of each state as the juvenile court acts were enacted.
9. A few jurisdictions made an effort to separate the youths from the older
offenders, but generally the child was treated in the same manner as was an adult.
It was thought that this resulted in the criminalization of the child. Mack The
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106-07 (1909). See generally Nicholas, Hsstory,
Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 J. FAM. L. 151 (1961).
10. In Chancery, the King acted in his capacity as parens patriae to provide the
ultimate guardianship over all infants in the realm. These same concepts were carried
forward into the jurisprudence of our colonies and states. This Latin phrase, parens
patriae, means "father of the country" and was later used by the juvenile court
reformers to express the role of the state in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 426-28; Mack, supra note 9. See also People v.
Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 8 Am. Rep. 645 (1870) ; State v. Rand, 132 Me. 246, 169 A. 898
(1934) ; Arthur, Should Children Be as Equal as People?, 45 N.D.L. REv. 204, 257
(1968); Fortas, Equal Rights - For Whom?, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 401, 405 (1967).
11. The juvenile court was to act as a clinic to treat the youth and to save him
from his criminal career. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 35 (1969) (Douglas,
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The incorporation of these concepts into the first Juvenile Court Act
occurred in Illinois in 1899.12 Every state ultimately adopted a juvenile
court act18 whereby the age of criminal responsibility was advanced by
the legislatures and the child was treated as a criminal only when a
juvenile court judge or statute permitted. Otherwise, delinquent children
were treated in equity courts through the parens patriae power of the
state. These proceedings were not considered to be criminal in nature. 14
In fact, it has only been recently that juvenile proceedings have been
classified as criminal with respect to certain procedural due process re-
quirements. In In re Gault 5 and In re Winship 6 the United States Su-
preme Court declared that procedural due process requires that a juvenile
be afforded the following rights: (1) the right to counsel; (2) the right
to confront accusing witnesses; (3) the right to have early notice of the
charges against him; (4) the right to protection against self-incrimi-
nation; and (5) the right to be found delinquent beyond a reasonable
doubt.
At the time of the Gault decision, however, the Supreme Court had
not yet decided whether the sixth amendment right to a trial by jury1 7
J., dissenting). Douglas, Juvenile Courts and lQue Process of Law, 19 Juv. CT. JJ. J.
9, 10 (1968).
12. LAWS OF ILL., Juvenile Courts (1899). See generally Comment, Constitutional
Rights and the Juvenile Court - The Need for National Unity and Federal Inter-
vention, 5 VILL. L. REV. 107 (1959).
13. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 69, 234 A.2d 9, 13 (1967),
noted in 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 330 (1967).
14. Mack, supra note 9, at 109. See, e.g., Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d
523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48,
62 A. 198 (1905).
15. Gault, fifteen years old, was accused of making lewd telephone calls. He was
committed as a juvenile delinquent to the Arizona State Industrial School until he
reached the age of twenty-one, unless discharged prior to that time. Had he been
an adult his maximum punishment would have been a fifty dollar fine or imprisonment
for not more than two months.
On appeal from the Arizona Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court
considered the effects of due process on the adjudicatory stage of a hearing to deter-
mine if a juvenile is "delinquent" as a result of committing a criminal act which has
as the consequence commitment to a state institution. It was specifically found thatjuveniles have the following constitutional safeguards: (1) a right to timely notice
of the charges; (2) benefit of counsel; (3) protection against self-incrimination; and
(4) right to confront the witnesses against them. The other two issues before the
Court, whether Gault had the right to a transcript of the proceedings and the right
to appellate review, were not decided. The right to trial by jury was not in issue
and therefore also not decided by the court. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See
V. NORDIN, GAULT: WHAT Now FOR THE JUVENILE COURT? (1968); Douglas, supra
note 11; Lehman, A Juvenile's Right to Counsel in a Delinquency Hearing, 17 Juv.
CT. JJ. J. 53 (1966) ; Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527(1968) ; Comment, Beyond Gault and Whittington - The Best of Both Worlds,
22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 906 (1968).
16. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Court held that juveniles, like adults, are consti-
tutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when they are charged with a
violation of a criminal law.
17. The United States Constitution provides that:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury .
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. It is further prescribed in the sixth amendment that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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was applicable to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.1 Finally, in 1968, the Court, in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana,19 held that the right to a jury trial in serious 20 criminal cases is a
fundamental right which must be recognized by the states in any criminal
proceeding. However, the Duncan decision was not conclusive on the
question whether a juvenile has a right to a jury trial. 21 In addition to
the absence of any language extending the right to a jury trial to juve-
niles, the Duncan court did not discuss whether a delinquency convic-
tion was "serious" enough to require a jury trial.2 2 Furthermore, even
after the Gault and Duncan decisions, only twelve states provided any
form of statutory right to a jury trial.2 3
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states in pertinent part:[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ....
19. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). There, the Court held that in all criminal cases the
fourteenth amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial if the case is such that,
were it to be tried in a federal court, it would fall within the guarantee of the sixth
amendment's right of jury trial.
In Bloom v. Illinois, the Court, in considering the interest of the individual
"not to be subjected to serious criminal punishment without the benefit of all the pro-
cedural protections . . . deemed fundamental to our system of justice," held that thejury trial provisions of the Constitution apply to a serious criminal contempt pro-
ceeding. 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1968).
20. The severity of the prescribed punishment determines whether an offense is
"petty" or "serious." A petty offense is an act for which the prescribed penalty is
less than six months in prison and a $500. fine, and which may be tried without ajury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160-61 (1968). See also District of Columbia
v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) ; Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904). Where
the possible penalty exceeds six months imprisonment, the offense is regarded as
"serious" and a right to a jury trial exists. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
21. The dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas in DeBacker v.
Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 33, 35 (1969), answered the question of a juvenile's right to
a jury trial in the affirmative, although the majority of the Court did not rule on the
issue.
22. The question of the seriousness of the allegations was not discussed by the
majority in Terry, although both Terry and McKeiver, had they been tried and
convicted as adults on the charges, would have been subject to substantial fines and
prison sentences. As related to Terry, in Pennsylvania the maximum penalty for an
adult convicted of assault and battery is a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars,
or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4708 (1963).
The maximum penalty for conspiracy to do an unlawful act, a misdemeanor, is a fine
not exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years or both.
PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4302 (1963). In regard to the actions of McKeiver, the possible
maximum penalty for robbery is imprisonment not exceeding twenty years or a fine
not greater than ten thousand dollars, or both. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4705 (1963). Thepenalty provided for larceny is five years imprisonment or a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars, or both. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4807 (1963). The penalty providedfor an adult who has received stolen goods is imprisonment not exceeding five years or
a fine not greater than one thousand dollars, or both. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4817 (1963).
23. The early Illinois juvenile act provided in pertinent part that:
In all trials under this act, any person interested therein may demand a jury of
six, or the judge of his own motion may order a jury of the same number, to try
the case.
LAWS OF ILL., Juvenile Courts § 2 (1899). This right was subsequently deleted by
most states and only the following states and the District of Columbia provide any
form of jury trial to the juvenile: ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (Supp. 1968) ; COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-8-2 (1964); D.C. CODE ENcYcLo. ANN. § 16-2307 (1966);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1967); MicH. CoMp. LAWS § 712 A. 17 (1968);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-603 (1947) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1110 (Supp. 1968) ;
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It is against this background of Duncan that the instant case be-
comes significant. In Commonwealth v. Johnson24 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court ruled that since the United States Supreme Court has never
held that the federal constitutional right of trial by jury is to be imposed
on the states, there was no merit in the contention that the denial of a
jury trial violates a juvenile's constitutional rights. 25  However, with
Duncan deciding precisely this issue, - whether the sixth amendment
right to a jury trial is a "fundamental right" which must be recognized
by the states - the Pennsylvania court, in the instant case, has decided
S.D. CODE § 43.0331 (1939) ; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904(53) (1961); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 48.25(2)(1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-108(c) (1965). See Comment, A Due Process
Dilemma - Juries for Juveniles, 45 N.D.L. REv. 251, 258 (1969).
Also, the following reports do not recommend juvenile jury trials, however,
some may be outdated by the recent Supreme Court decisions: THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 38 (1967) ; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 73(1966); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, COUNCIL OF JUDGES,
MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS 58 (1969) ; HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT
ACT 248, 266 (1968).
The philosophy of most of the juvenile court acts, including those states listed
above which still retain juvenile jury provisions, is that the child is not to be accused,
nor is the stigma of criminal guilt to be placed upon him. He is merely to be offered
assistance and training by the state if needed. Lehman, supra note 15; Paulsen,
Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 548 (1957).
Several courts have also determined that a right of jury trial exists for thejuvenile delinquent. In Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
the court found unconstitutional the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 5033 (1964), insofar as it denied a jury trial to an accused juvenile delinquent
charged with violation of a federal criminal statute. See also Peyton v. Nord, 78
N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968) (jury trial guaranteed by New Mexico Constitution)
In re Rindell, 36 U.S.L.W. 2468 (R.I. Family Ct. 1968) (jury trial permitted).
24. 211 Pa. Super. 62, 67, 234 A.2d 9, 12 (1967).
25. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 6. provides in relevant part:
Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate.
Also, in Article 1, section 9, it is provided that:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to . . . a speedy public trial
by an impartial jury of the vicinage ....
It is interesting to note that the first Juvenile Court Law in the Common-
wealth, Act of May 21, 1901, P.L. 279, was found to be in violation of the Pennsylvania
Constitution insofar as it did not provide a juvenile accused of delinquency with the
right to a jury trial. Mansfield's Case, 22 Pa. Super. 224 (1903). However, when ajuvenile was tried under the Juvenile Court Act of April 23, 1903, P.L. 274, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court impliedly overruled Mansfield's Case in Commonwealth
v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905), stating:
[Tihe proceeding is not one according to the course of the common law, in which
the right of trial by jury is guarantied [sic], but a mere statutory proceeding for
the accomplishment of the protection of the helpless, which object was accom-
plished before the Constitution without the enjoyment of a jury trial.
Id. at 56, 62 A. at 201.
This opinion was followed in Commonwealth v. Carnes, 82 Pa. Super. 335(1923), and was continued under the current Juvenile Court Act of June 2, 1933,
P.L. 1433. See Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954) ; Commonwealth
v. Henig, 200 Pa. Super. 614, 189 A.2d 894, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 908 (1963) ; Mont
Appeal, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954). See note 5 supra. For a general
discussion of the current Juvenile Court Act, see Comment, The Pennsylvania Legis-
lature, the Juvenile Courts, and the Ghost of H355 - A Need for Reconsideration.
70 DICK. L. REV. 357, 361 (1966).
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to definitively state the reasons26 for maintaining the status quo of the
juvenile court system, and to reconcile them with the Gault and Duncan
decisions.
In considering whether a juvenile has a constitutional right to a jury
trial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the instant case had to first
address itself to the question whether Duncan compelled a finding that
such a right exists. The court took the position that while most of the
language in Duncan was sweeping in scope, a footnote in the case2T had
effectively narrowed the affirmative commands of the holding. The court
interpreted the footnote as indicating that a jury was not necessarily
fundamental to a fair and equitable criminal system if alternative guar-
antees and protections were provided.28 However, as the dissent points
out, a close reading of Duncan reveals that the majority's interpretation
is clearly erroneous. In Duncan the Court was adopting a new standard
of selective incorporation by narrowing its scope of inquiry from the
traditional formula of whether any fair and equitable legal system could
be imagined without a particular safeguard, to a formula which inquired
whether a particular safeguard was fundamental to the Anglo-American
scheme of legal justice. Therefore, when the Duncan Court footnoted to
the fact that other systems might provide similar safeguards, it was
merely illustrating that the existence of such systems is irrelevant for
this purpose and that the focus is solely upon the Anglo-American
system. 29
After deciding that Duncan did not necessarily require a jury in
juvenile proceedings, the Terry court next examined Gault, reaching the
conclusion that "the Supreme Court [had] specifically refused to apply
the totality of the due process procedural safeguards to juvenile courts."80
26. Another reason why jury trials for juveniles are not provided in Pennsylvania
was stated earlier in Commonwealth v. Lash, 151 Pa. Super. 601, 30 A.2d 609 (1943).
There, the purpose of the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Law was stated to be as follows:
[D]elinquent children are not criminals .... they should not be dealt with as such,
and .. . a judge, acting without the intervention of jury, should have wide lati-
tude in dealing with the problem of their punishment and guidance. It was on
the ground the courts were not, in such cases, dealing with criminal offenses that
elimination of the jury was upheld.
Id. at 603, 30 A.2d at 610.
27. 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
28. The Pennsylvania court in In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 345-46, 265 A.2d 350,
353 (1970), quoted from that part of Duncan in which the Supreme Court inquired
into a criminal system to determine whether jury trials were "necessary to an Anglo-
American regime of ordered liberty." 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
29. 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
30. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 346, 265 A.2d 350, 353-54 (1970). The Pennsyl-
vania court said that the carefully tailored holding in Gault denied any conclusion,
based on its sweeping rationale, that all the requirements of due process must be
complied with in a juvenile court. Consequently, the court suggested that it should
rely on its own interpretation of the Constitution. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d
350 (1970). The court then quoted extensively from Gault, the pertinent parts of
which are as follows:
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and pro-
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With this restriction in mind, the court proceeded to determine whether
the right to a jury trial in juvenile courts was a "fundamental right"
within the meaning of Duncan. Initially, the court found that the four
rights enunciated in Gault3' had already caused a significant "constitu-
tional domestication" 32 of the juvenile courts. In addition, it noted that
the right of appellate review and the right to have a transcript of the
hearing were present in the Pennsylvania juvenile court system8 3 Ac-
cording to the majority, these six rights coupled with the Winship re-
quirement3 4 that all allegations be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
were sufficient to insure an atmosphere in juvenile courts which would
properly impress upon a youth the gravity of his situation and the im-
partiality of the tribunal. 85
Upon close consideration, however, it seems that the impact of the
procedural due process created by the effectuation of these rights upon
juvenile offenders is tenuous. For example, a juvenile's awareness that
he must be found "delinquent" beyond a reasonable doubt instead of by
a preponderance of the evidence, would seem to have little rehabilitating
effect upon a sixteen year old offender. Furthermore, the right of appellate
review and the right to have a transcript apply only after the initial
hearing has terminated and not during the adjudication stage. It seems
cedure .... The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle
has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from
established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened
procedure, but in arbitrariness.
387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967).
Due process of law is the primary and indispensible foundation of individual
freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the
rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise.
Id. at 20.
The Pennsylvania court believed that the focus of Gault narrowed when the
Supreme Court quoted the following language from Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 562 (1966) :
"We do not mean . . . to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with
all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative
hearing; but we do hold that the essentials must measure up to the essentials of
due process and fair treatment." We reiterate this view, here in conjunction with
a juvenile court adjudication of "delinquency," as a requirement which is part of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967).
For a similar view, see Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in In re
Winship, where he stated that there was not an "automatic congruence" between the
procedural due process requirements in criminal and juvenile cases. 397 U.S. 358,
374-75 (1970).
31. See note 15 supra.
32. Mr. Justice Fortas for the majority in Gault said:
But the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are
of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication. For
example, the commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of
juveniles separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the pro-
cedural issues under discussion.
387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
33. See note 6 supra.
34. See note 16 supra.
35. Contra, Tenney, The New Dilemma in the Juvenile Court, 47 NEB. L. REv.
67, 76 (1968).
[VOL. 16
17
Editors: Recent Developments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
that the primary issue at hand is whether a juvenile is being denied
constitutional due process and that the impact of the adjudicatory hear-
ing on the child is only a secondary concern even supposing that the
hearing has a positive rehabilitating effect on the youth.
In further pursuing this inquiry, the Terry court reasoned that since
the Supreme Court in Duncan decided that the right to a jury trial was
"fundamental" in the context of the adult criminal process, any determi-
nation of a juvenile's right to a jury trial should pivot around the ques-
tion whether there are elements in the juvenile system which render the
right to a trial by jury less essential to the protection of an accused's
rights than in the adult criminal process, therefore making it not so
"fundamental" that it is to be constitutionally required 6
The first factor considered by the majority as an element rendering
a jury trial less essential for juvenile justice is that juvenile court judges
have "a different view of their role than that taken by their counterparts
in the criminal courts."3 7 While admitting that this element was not an
entirely satisfactory substitution for due process, it was attributed sig-
nificance.38 Although there is no question that a juvenile should be
treated differently than an adult, and that a skilled and understanding
judge is needed, his intended role in the juvenile process"9 is at odds
with actual practice. In many of today's juvenile courts, overcrowding,
understaffing, 40 and the absence of legally trained judges is prominent. 41
In fact, the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States42 suggested that
present juvenile courts even lack the facilities to adequately perform in
a parens patriae capacity. Admittedly, the duties and functions of a
judge in a juvenile court are varied and important. He must guide and
approve all decisions at the intake proceeding regarding the disposition
of or investigation into the sociological, physical, or psychological state
of the child. During the adjudicatory process, he must weigh all of the
known facts of the crime and factors relating to the child and subse-
quently, in the dispositional phase, prescribe a formula which will best
aid the youth. In addition, he must, in a short period of time, try to
instill the child with values which will permanently deter him from a
36. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 348, 265 A.2d 350, 354 (1970). See Note, Juries
in the Juvenile System?, 48 N.C.L. REv. 666, 672 (1970).
37. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 348, 265 A.2d 350, 354-55 (1970). See generally
Parker, Instant Maturation for the Post-Gault "Hood" 4 FAMILY L.Q. 113 (1970).
38. 438 Pa. 339, 348, 265 A.2d 350, 355 (1970).
39. Mack, supra note 9.
40. Judge Paul S. Lehman of Pennsylvania stated:
Unfortunately, loose procedures, high-handed methods and crowded court calen-
dars, either singly or in combination, all too often, have resulted in depriving somejuveniles of fundamental rights that have resulted in a denial of due process.
Lehman, supra note 15, at 54.
41. McCune & Skoler, Juvenile Court Judges in the United States, Part I, A
National Profile, 11 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 121, 128-29 (1965).
42. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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further career in crime.43 However, it is submitted that these special
characteristics of a juvenile judge should continue to exist in the intake
and dispositional stages, but that after Gault the emphasis in the adjudi-
catory stage of a juvenile proceeding must be upon the reliability of
the fact-finding process, thus diminishing the importance of the unique
role of the judge during this stage. Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Winship recently stated that extreme caution in fact-finding applies as
equally to an innocent child as it does to an innocent adult.44 Further-
more, the dissent in Terry45 found Winship applicable in this regard and
pointed out that the Winship Court made it quite clear that good inten-
tions and "civil" labels could not take the place of due process safeguards
for the juvenile.46
A second element considered by the Terry court as rendering a
jury trial less essential to the juvenile system is the fact that this system
has available and most fully utilizes various diagnostic and rehabilitative
services.47 The court took the position that the correctional, rehabilita-
tive and instructional attention that could be afforded each juvenile was
the best reason for preserving the juvenile system, even though, in fact,
the actual attention given is less than the potential. But, as the dissent
points out, the above consideration is best applied to the dispositional
rather than to the adjudicative stage. Even if the juvenile is eventually
granted all of the procedural due process guarantees during the trial
itself, the rehabilitative aspect of sentencing would still be all important.
Additionally, the objective of rehabilitation is present in both juvenile
and adult criminal proceedings. Therefore, the application of a lesser
standard of justice to a juvenile is not justified on the theory that one
wishes to save him.48 It seems that the proper place to implement cor-
rective behaviorial measures is before a crime is committed and not dur-
ing the guilt determining process. Moreover, the "diagnostic services"
referred to by the court would be appropriate to the pre-hearing and
dispositional stages and do not seem relevant to the adjudicatory stage.
Furthermore, it is submitted that since the legality of a juvenile's com-
mitment is the central issue during adjudication and not the quantum
of care he receives in an institution,49 the granting of a right to a jury
trial would not seem to "interfere with the worthy goal of rehabilitating
the juvenile". 0
43. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 75-76, 234 A.2d 9, 16 (1967).
44. 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970).
45. 438 Pa. 339, 352-53, 265 A.2d 350, 357 (1967).
46. 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970).
47. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 348, 265 A.2d 350, 355 (1970).
48. See generally Whitlatch, The Juvenile Court - A Court of Law, 18 W. RES.
L. REV. 1239 (1967) -Young, Due Process and the Rights of Children, 18 Juv. CT.
JJ. J. 102 (1967). .
49. See Forer, Rights of Children; The Legal Vacuum, 55 A.B.A.J. 1151 (1969).
See generally. Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORN-ELL L.Q.
387 (1961).
50. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Harlan,.J., dissenting).
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The third element considered by the Terry court as rendering a jury
trial less essential to the juvenile system is the recognition that "the end
result of a declaration of delinquency is significantly different from and
less onerous than a finding of criminal guilt."' In finding this factor a
significant element of difference between the juvenile and adult systems,
the court reasoned that there is no public record of the adjudication,52
the results are not admissible in subsequent legal proceedings,53 none of
the disabilities which follow a criminal conviction attach to an adjudi-
cated delinquent, 54 and that the institutions to which juveniles are com-
mitted are something more than jails55 since there is a greater emphasis
on rehabilitation. The dissent,56 however, contended that this entire
argument was constitutionally irrelevant since Gault had effectively elimi-
nated these factors as justifications for applying different due process
standards to juveniles. 57
One possible reason underlying the Pennsylvania court's inclusion
of this element into their analysis is the belief that a juvenile proceeding
has civil overtones which render it something less than criminal in
nature.5" However, in discussing the civil-criminal dichotomy, the Court
51. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 349, 265 A.2d 350 355 (1970). See note 4 supra.
But see Douglas, supra note 11, at 12; Paulsen, The Juvenile Court and the Whole of
the Law, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 597, 615 (1965). See also Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599,
611-12, 109 A.2d 523, 528 (1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
52. The court records are quite often open to the police, FBI, military and
government agencies. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and
Individualized Justice, 79 HiRv. L. REv. 775, 794-95 (1966). While the Pennsylvania
statute prescribes that the records of the proceedings of the juvenile courts shall be
withheld from indiscriminate public inspection, it provides for inspection by other per-
sons having a legitimate interest. PA. STAT. tit. 11 § 245 (1965). See generally
Comment, Juveniles and Their Right to a Jury Trial, 15 ViLL. L. REv. 972 (1970).
53. While the Pennsylvania Act bars evidence of the disposition made of a child
by a juvenile court in an adult criminal proceeding to determine innocence or guilt,
the act does not bar its use for the purpose of determining sentence. Commonwealth
ex rel. Wanko v. Russell, 176 A.2d 171, 196 Pa. Super. 565 (1961) ; Commonwealth
ex rel. Hendrickson v. Myers, 144 A.2d 367, 393 Pa. 224 (1958). The Juvenile Court
also can use self-incriminatory testimony to send a juvenile to the Grand Jury. In re
Gaskins, 430 Pa. 298, 244 A.2d 662, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 989 (1968).
54. PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 261 (1965). But see Note, The Denial of Trial by Jury
and Representation by Counsel to Juvenile Offenders: A Denial of Due Process of
Law and/or the Equal Protection of the Laws, 7 How. L.J. 161, 163-64 (1961).
55. No matter what name you put on the institution, it is still a place of confine-
ment. The child's family and playmates are replaced by guards and other "delin-
quents." In -re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). See Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 616,
109 A.2d 523, 530 (1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting). See Paulsen, The Child, the
Court and the Commission, 18 Juv. CT..JJ. J. 73, 80 (1967) ; Tenney, supra note 35,
at 70.
56. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 354, 265 A.2d 350, 357 (1970).
57. Also, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970), the Court found the
following arguments to be untenable: (1) a delinquency adjudication is not a con-
viction; (2) it affects no right or privilege; and (3) it is confidential.
58. Commonwealth v. johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967); Holmes'
Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1955). Other decisions, after Gault but before
Winship,. which have noted that juvenile proceedings were civil in nature and thus a
trial by jury was not an essential element of a juvenile's adjudicatory proceeding
include: In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 255 A.2d 419 (1969) ; In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.
2d'10, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969); In re Turner, Ore. , 453 P.2d 910 (1969).
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in Gault reasoned that juvenile delinquency proceedings must be regarded
as "criminal" for the purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination
if it may lead to commitment in a state institution for a substantial period
of time.59 In addition, Mr. Justice Brennan in Winship, suggested that
when a juvenile is adjudicated on a criminal act the proceeding is one
which requires criminal due process safeguards 0 to the extent that they
are related to the quantum of proof necessary to convict the juvenile.
Therefore, it is possible to carry this reasoning one step further and to
conclude that there is no longer a "civil-criminal" distinction between
delinquency cases and adult crimes as far as procedural due process re-
quirements are concerned. It would then appear that the opinion ex-
pressed by the dissent in Terry on this element was the more reasonable.
The final element recognized by the court as a justification for not
constitutionally requiring that a juvenile be granted the right to a jury
trial was that, "[ojf all the possible due process rights which could be
applied in the juvenile courts, the right to trial by jury is the one which
would most likely be disruptive of the unique nature of the juvenile
process." 61 The majority asserted that a jury trial would require the
judge to abandon traditional practices, such as acting in a quasi-parental
manner or by inquiry into the suitability of the child's home life, and to
become more concerned with the technicalities of procedure which would
ultimately reduce his capacity to guide and mold those hearings through
the exercise of his broad discretionary powers to synthesize a remedy
which has considered the nature of the crime, the age of the child and
the individual needs of the child and parent. 62 The dissent, however,
while agreeing that the flexibility and informality of the hearing would
be reduced, argued that this flexibility and informality are not ends in
themselves and that their abatement during the adjudicatory stage would
have a small effect on the rehabilitative capacities of the juvenile system
which mainly occur outside this stage.6"
Other recent cases which have denied a juvenile the right to a jury trial include:
In re Fucini, 44 Il1. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380, appeal docketed, sub nom. Fucini v.
Illinois, petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. April 6, 1970) (No. 1390,
1969 Term; renumbered No. 122, 1970 Term) (1970); In re D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261
N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970) ; In re Burrus, 4 N.C. App. 523, 167 S.E.2d
454, appeal denied, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1036
(1970); In re Geiger, 184 Neb. 581, 169 N.W.2d 431 (1969); In re Hopkins, 227
So. 2d 282 (Miss. 1969); Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. Ct. App.
1968) ; Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968).
59. Speaking of the classification as a "delinquent," the Gault Court also stated:
It is disconcerting, however, that this term has come to involve only slightly less
stigma than the term "criminal" as applied to adults.
387 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1970).
60. 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970).
61. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 350, 265 A.2d 350, 355 (1970).
6Z See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
63. This view is supported by the majority opinion in Gault, where Mr. Justice
Fortas appeared to negate the belief that any substantial benefits accrued to the child
from an informal court hearing. 387 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1967). See Comment, supra
note 52, at 989-91.
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Another of the unique characteristics of the juvenile system which,
it may be argued, is particularly advantageous to the juvenile delinquent
is the privacy of the proceedings. Only the family of the child generally
appears in court with him. However, the requirement of privacy does
not necessarily conflict with the presence of a jury.64 First, the child
and his parents are the parties who would request a jury and thereby
waive the secrecy of the hearing. Second, since the Supreme Court in
Williams v. Florida65 held that a twelve-man panel is not a necessary
ingredient of a jury trial in a state court, a panel substantially smaller
than twelve could meet the constitutional requirements for due process
and not delude the aura of confidentiality. Thus, the right to a fact-
finding determination by a jury could be retained66 while the child elects
to either exercise this right or to waive it to obtain the maximum possible
privacy. 67
Should a juvenile be afforded the full measure of constitutional
procedural due process, including the right to trial by jury, it is possible
that a multiplicity of other problems will arise. The panoply would
probably encompass strains on various aspects of the juvenile court sys-
tem including courtrooms, prosecutors, defense counsel, judges68 and
the administrative systems. Furthermore, due consideration must be
given to the possibility that a jury trial might hamper the juvenile process
to the extent that: (1) the child or society would suffer damage as a
result of delay in adjudication; and (2) the juvenile proceeding itself
might break down under the burdens of granting this right. However,
it seems that most of these consequences could be avoided by the imple-
mentation of the basic tenets of diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation
in the pre-hearing and dispositional stages of the delinquency process.
Thus, during the adjudicatory stage of a proceeding where a juvenile has
been accused of an act which, if committed by an adult, would be "serious"
enough to entitle the adult to a trial by jury, a juvenile should be con-
sidered to have a fundamental constitutional right to elect a jury trial.
Hedy Moehling Bowman
64. See generally Comment, supra note 52, at 991-92.
65. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In speaking of the number of jurors constitutionally
required, the Court listed two criteria: (1) the number should be large enough to
prohibit outside intimidation, and to promote group discussion; and (2) the number
should be large enough to permit a fair representation from a cross section of the
community. Id. at 100.
66. See note 23 supra.
67. It is possible that the right, once granted, would be rarely exercised and
that the child would prefer to retain the privacy and uniqueness of his hearing.
V. NORDIN, supra note 15, at 66; Comment, supra note 52, at 995. In England,
where a young person over the age of fourteen has the right to a jury trial for any
offense for which an adult would be liable to more than three months imprisonment,
the right is rarely exercised. Overland & Newhouse, Juvenile Criminal Law in the
Federal Republic of Germany and in England, 4 CALIF. W.L. REv. 35, 56 (1968).
68. Brief for Appellee at 31, In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTIONS - PROP-
ERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUSLY OWNED PROPERTY USED
SOLELY FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE
RELIGIOUS CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
Walz v. Tax Commission of The City of New York
(U.S. 1970)
Plaintiff, owner of real property situated in Richmond County, New
York, sought an injunction in a lower New York court to enjoin the
New York City Tax Commission from granting property tax exemptions
to religious organizations for property used solely for religious worship
as provided by the New York Constitution1 and implemented by statute.2
Plaintiff contended that the exemption indirectly forced him to con-
tribute to religious bodies, and therefore, was an establishment of religion
in violation of the first amendment of the United States Constitution.8
The Tax Commission's motion for summary judgment was granted.
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court 4
and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 5 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed, holding that federal or
state grants of tax exemptions for religious properties used solely for
religious purposes, did not violate the religious clauses of the first amend-
ment. Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664
(1970).
For many years, church-state relations were strictly within the do-
main of the several states and where not considered within the purview
of the first amendment religious clauses.6 Then, in Cantwell v. Connecti-
1. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1, provides that:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may
be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal property used
exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law
and owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively
for one or more of such purposes and not operating for profit.
2. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-1 (McKinney Supp. 1970) amending
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-1 (McKinney 1960), states in partinent part:
Real property owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively for
the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract,
charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public play-
ground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic,
historical or cemetery purposes . . . and used exclusively for carrying out there-
upon one or more of such purposes.., shall be exempt from taxation as provided
in this section.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1, provides in pertinent part:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof....
4. Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 30 App. Div. 2d 778,
292 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1968).
5. Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d
517, 298 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1969).
6. Cf. Garrett Biblical Institute v. Elmhurst State Bank, 331 Ill. 308, 163 N.E. 1
(1928); M.E. Church, South v. Hinton, 92 Tenn. 188, 21 S.W. 321, 322 (1893);
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cut,7 and later in Everson v. Board of Education,8 the Supreme Court
bound the states to the free-exercise and establishment clauses. The Court
in Everson, in upholding the New Jersey practice of reimbursement of
bus fares for school children attending nonpublic schools, concluded that
the state's action was justified because it constituted a program of general
public welfare. 9 These two cases opened the door of the federal courts
and made it possible for an individual to challenge a wide range of state
practices as being violative of the first amendement. 10
In the area of governmental aid to parochial schools, Everson and
its public welfare rationale remained the leading case until the 1968
Supreme Court decision in Board of Education v. Allen." In Allen,
the Court refused to rely principally on the Everson public welfare
rationale' 2 in upholding a New York statute'1 that provided for the
loan of secular textbooks to parochial school children, but instead
chose to adopt the test' 4 employed in the Bible reading case of Abinglon
School District v. Schempp.'1 This test provided that for a legislative
enactment to "withstand the strictures of the establishment clause" it
must have a "secular purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion."' 6  Thus, the Allen decision effectively replaced
Everson as the principle case in this area and "also confirmed previous
indications that the Court is committed to advancing a unitary test
of religious liberty under both religion clauses of the First Amend-
Trustees v. Iowa, 46 Iowa 275, 26 Am. Rep. 138 (1877). See generally R. DRINAN,
RELIGION, THE COURTS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1963).
7. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
8. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9. Id. at 18.
10. As to aid to parochial schools, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.236 (1968) ; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See generally L. PFEPFER,
CHURCH STATE AND FREEDoM (1967).
As to the Sunday Law Cases, see, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599(1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley,
366 U.S. 582 (1961).
As to unemployment compensation, see, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
As to Bible reading in the public schools, see, e.g., Abington School Dist. v.Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
As to religious oaths of office, see, e.g., Torcaso v. Watldns, 367 U.S. 488(1961).
As to "release time" programs, see, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306(1952) ; McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
11. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
12. The Court did state in Allen that the secular purpose and primary effect test
would sustain the Everson holding. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
13. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
14. 392 U.S. at 243.
15. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). This test originated in the Sunday Law Cases, e.g.,McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and was refined and firmly established
in Schempp.
16. Id. at 222.
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ment, applicable to all forms of government action whether regulatory
or spending.' 7
In the instant case, the Court confronted for the first time'8 the
precise question whether a property tax exemption for religiously own-
ed and used property is constitutionally valid. Choosing to adopt the
"secular purpose and primary effect" test advanced in Allen,19 the
Court found that the purpose of the New York statute neither advanced
nor inhibited religion.20 This conclusion was based upon three find-
ings. First, the Court found that New York considered those entities
which fostered mental and moral improvement to be beneficial and
should therefore, "not be inhibited . . . by property taxation .... "1
Second, the Court pointed to the breadth of the statute as evidence of
a secular purpose 22 reasoning that:
[The legislature] has not singled out one particular church or re-
ligious group or even churches as such; rather, it has granted ex-
emption to all houses of religious worship within a broad class of
property owned by nonprofit, quasipublic corporations .... 23
Finally, the Court noted that in the past churches were often perse-
cuted in various ways, including taxation,2 4 and that "exemption constitutes
a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard against those dangers."
25
Having determined the statute's purpose to be constitutionally
permissible because it did not establish, sponsor, or support religion,
the Court turned to the more difficult determination of the statute's
primary effect.26 As noted previously, in Allen the primary effect was
determined by ascertaining whether or not the statute advanced or
inhibited religion.2 7 However, the Walz Court chose to alter this deter-
17. Valente, Aid to Church Related Education - New Directions Without
Dogma, 55 VA. L. REV. 579, 585 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
18. There are, however, several instances where the Court declined to entertain
the question. See, e.g., Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216
A.2d 897, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966) ; Lundberg v. Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644,
298 P.2d 1, app. dismissed, 352 U.S. 921 (1956). But see Gibbon v. District of
Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886), where the Supreme Court decided that certain
property did not qualify for a religious property tax exemption. The Gibbon Court,
however, without specifically being faced with the issue of whether the tax exemption
of church property was valid, implicitly accepted the legislature's right to exempt or
tax as it sees fit, and apparently the constitutionality of these exemptions. 116 U.S.
at 407-08. The Wala Court noted Gibbon pointing out that the broad question of tax
exemption was before that Court, while not the precise question presented in Walz.
19. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
20. 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 673. The proposition used by the majority was heavily relied upon by
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion where he stated:
In any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of the
legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious
institutions could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter.
Id. at 696.
23. 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
24. Id.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 674.
27. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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mination by establishing a new standard. It was advanced by the Court
as follows:
We must . .. be sure that the end result - the effect - is not an
excessive government entanglement with religion.28
Having established this new standard, the Court proceeded to deter-
mine the effect of the New York property tax exemptions.
Conceding that tax exemptions afford an indirect economic bene-
fit to religious organizations,2 9 the Court found that the abolition of
the tax exempt status of religious organizations, would expand state
involvement "by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax
liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that
follow in the train of those legal processes."8 0 In either situation -
taxation or exemption - the analysis should focus on "whether the
involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling
for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible
degree of entanglement."31 Finally, the Court concluded that exemp-
tion creates only a remote involvement which is far less than taxation
would create.8 2
In reaching its conclusion that tax exemptions for religious insti-
tutions do not have a purpose or primary effect violative of the religious
clauses of the first amendment, 8 the Walz Court, although relying
primarily on recent precedent to reach its conclusion on the purpose
moiety of the test,3 4 has apparently adopted a new rationale for deter-
mining the effect.8 5 In looking at the purpose of the tax exemption,
the Court concluded that it was "neither the advancement nor the in-
hibition of religion . . ."36 and that it was not "sponsorship" or hostil-
ity." 7 To bolster this conclusion, the Walz Court relied on the his-
torical origin of this type of exemption,38 noting that churches were often
persecuted in the past by making them support the state.8 9 It em-
phasized that exemption is a reasonable method of preventing this perse-
cution. 40 While the history of this area is ambiguous, 41 and various
28. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 674. This line of reasoning by the Court leads one to wonder if taxa-
tion, not exemption is constitutional. Cf. Maryland Virginia Eldership of the Churches
of God v. The Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368-70 (1970);
P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962).
31. 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
32. Id. at 676.
33. Id. at 680.
34. Id. at 673.
35. Id. at 674.
36. Id. at 672.
37. See 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
38. 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
39. Id. at 675.
40. Id. at 674-75.
41. See Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ; Hudspeth,
Separation of Church and State in America, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 1035 (1955). See
generally C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CON-
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religious faiths were often persecuted, the Court failed to cite any
authority substantiating the proposition that exemptions stemmed from
the concern for persecution. 42  Rather, there are various authorities
which tend to show that religious tax exemption arose from establish-
ment since the established church was considered to be part of the
state and its taxation would have resulted in self-taxation. 4a  Despite
this possible misinterpretation of the historical basis for exemption, the
Court appears to be correct in finding the purpose of the statute con-
stitutional, since Allen and at least one case applying Allen 44 have
indicated that the courts should be reluctant to impugn the expressed
legislative purpose. The Wala Court's perfunctory application of the
purpose aspect of the test may be interpreted as following this position.
While the Court simply applied the advancement and inhibition
criteria in determining the secular purpose aspect of the tax exemption
statute, it did not do so in determining its primary effect. Although in
Allen, the advancement and inhibition criteria were used to determine the
primary effect, 45 the Court in the instant case looked to whether the effect
of the tax exemption was "an excessive government entanglement with
religion. ' 46 Presumably, the Court has cut through the confusion in this
area to arrive at the basic premise upon which the previous cases rested,
finding as its common denominator minimal governmental involvement
with religion. 47
Since no previous case has treated the "primary effect" test in this
manner,4 8 the question arises whether the new involvement standard will
STITUTIONS (1965); C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FRUIEOM PROM FEDERAL
ESTABLISHMENT (1964).
42. 397 U.S. at 675.
43. Hurvich, Religion and the Taxing Power, 35 U. CIN. L. Rsv. 531, 534 (1966);Stimson, The Exemption of Churches from Taxation, 18 TAXES 361-62 (1940);
Zollman, Tax Exemption of American Church Property, 14 MICH. L. REv. 646, 648(1916). See also T. BAILEY THE AMERICAN PAGEANT 74, 75 (3d ed. 1966):
Symposium - Constitutional Problems in Church-State Relations, 61 Nw. U.L. REV.
759, 790 (1966). But see Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemption for
Religious Activities in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95, 110 (D. Oaks
ed. 1963).
44. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35, 45 (E.D. Pa. 1969), cert. granted,
397 U.S. 1034 (1970) (No. 1189), where the court refused to make an independent
finding as to the purpose, and accepted that given by the legislature as controlling.
See also 15 VILL. L. REV. 477 (1970).
45. 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
46. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
47. This was not made explicit by the Court, but its lack of discussion here in-
dicates that perhaps no change in position actually occurred.
48. But see Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson, where this policy of non-
involvement may be observed. There, for example, he stated:
It [the first amendment] was to create a complete and permanent separation of
the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding
every form of public aid or support for religion.
330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the concept of
intermingling of politics and religion has also been recognized in the area of religious
establishment as, for example, where a parochial school might become more secular
in an attempt to qualify for greater state aid. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310
F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (Hastie, C.J., dissenting). See generally D. OAKS, THE
WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (1963); cf. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969).
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clarify or confuse the "primary effect" inquiry. For example, the applica-
tion of the Walz involvement standard to the "primary effect" test raises
the question whether the New York program for supplying secular text-
books to parochial schools, held constitutional in Allen,49 would similiarly
be upheld under Walz. Under the New York program elaborate pre-
cautions were taken to ensure that the textbooks to be loaned to students
were secular in nature 0 and that they were not loaned until the student
made a specific request for them and the school board had decided
whether or not the books were secular or sectarian in nature. This called
for a complex system of review on the part of the state vis-a-vis the
state school board.51 It can be argued that the appropriation of secular
textbooks is within the principles of political neutrality52 and that it had
the effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion. 58 However, appli-
cation of the involvement standard could reasonably lead to the conclusion
that control by public officials over one activity of religious institutions
selection of textbooks - creates an unconstitutional "effect".
Similarly, the holding of the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in Lemon v. Kurtzman,54 that a Pennsylvania
Act 5 allowing appropriation of state funds to sectarian schools does not
have an unconstitutional effect, also seems subject to doubt under the
Walz involvement standard.
In Lemon,5 6 the statute in question provided for the creation of a
fund from state horse racing taxes, for the purchase of secular educa-
tional services from nonpublic schools by the Superintendent of Public
Instruction.57 As with any statutory spending provision, there is state
regulation of collection and disbursal of funds. Furthermore, it is incum-
bent upon the Auditor General under the terms of the statute to deter-
mine which services have been performed and to make a complete audit
before payment.5 8 In addition, the statute specifies that only four pre-
scribed instructional areas may be subsidized; mathematics, physical
science, physical education, and modern foreign languages.59
It seems clear from an examination of the regulatory scheme created
by the Pennsylvania statute that several determinative questions concern-
ing its application exist. They are: (1) what is secular and what is not;
(2) what is the actual cost of instruction; and (3) if the funds are
inadequate in any given year, what type of distribution scheme will be
49. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
50. Id. at 239.
51. Id.
52. For an exhaustive analysis of doctrinal neutrality in the religious establish-
ment area, see Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment, Part II: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. Rsv. 513 (1968).
53. This was the holding in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
54. 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
55. PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1969).
56. This case is scheduled to be heard by the Supreme Court during the October
1970 term. Cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1034 (1970) (No. 1189).
57. PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1969).
58. PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 5607(a) (Supp. 1969).
59. PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1969).
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employed. The answer to these questions and the solution to the many
administrative details related to this regulatory scheme will have to flow
from "sustained and detailed administrative relationships for enforce-
ment of statutory or administrative standards . . ." which the Walz
Court seemingly viewed as an unconstitutional "primary effect". 60
However, these fears may prove ill-founded because, as the Walz
Court noted, the "test is inescapably one of degree." 6' 1 Therefore, it is
conceivable that the Court could find the above statutory scheme to be
constitutional using a balancing approach to the involvement standard. It
is submitted, however, that the Court may find it more desirable in some
areas of religious establishment to retain the advancement or inhibition -6 2
criteria in determining a statute's effect, using involvement as only one
factor in that determination. In the area of parochial school aid, this may
be particularly beneficial since what appears in Walz to be an expansion
of the aid doctrine may, as previously discussed, curtail future aid pro-
grams.
It is possible that vestiges of the Allen focus - application of the
advancement and inhibition criteria to determine the primary effect of a
statute - have been retained by the Court63 since, in Walz6 as in Allen,6 5
it found that benefit to religion was one of the effects of the statute, but
that this benefit alone was not enough to invalidate the statute since it was
not the primary effect as measured by the involvement standard.66  Fur-
thermore, the Walz Court found it necessary to determine whether or not
the exemption sponsored religion,6 a determination which is seemingly
not required by the involvement standard. The Walz Court found that
tax exemptions for property used solely for religious purposes did not
sponsor religion because there did not exist active transfers of funds
from the state to the church qua church.68 While in Allen and Lemon
there was an active transfer of funds, 9 the primary effect of the statute
was not advancement of religion since the grants were made to the
church qua social welfare organization and not to the church qua church.70
However, the Court could not entirely accept the "advancement" cri-
terion, because, economically speaking, the only effect of tax exemption is
the support of religion when viewed within the narrow context of the
60. 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
61. Id. at 674.
62. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
63. See Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
64. Id. at 674.
65. See note 61 supra.
66. See 397 U.S. at 675.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See text accompanying notes 49 & 56 supra.
70. Since in Allen and Lemon the grant was to the church qua social welfare
organization, the primary effect was not the advancement of religion. See Allen v.
Board of Educ., 392 U.S. 236, 243, 248 (1968); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp.
35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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advancement-inhibition criterion.7' The difficulty encountered with the
sponsorship concept is quite similar to that which would have been en-
countered had the Court sought to justify property tax exemptions with
a public or social welfare rationale. This difficulty may have motivated the
Court when it specifically refused to rely on a public welfare doctrine. 2
Ostensibly, the Court's rationale for abandoning the public welfare doc-
trine was that it might cause too much involvement between church and
state, and hence, violate the primary effect portion of the test under the
involvement standard.73 One possible reason for the Court's abandonment
of the public welfare doctrine is that any benefit inuring to the church
through tax exemptions for property used solely for religious purposes
must be to the church qua church and not to the church qua social welfare
organization since there is no general public welfare when the property
exempted is used for the benefit of religion only.7 4
Apart from the impact of the instant decision on aid to sectarian
schools and the other social welfare functions of religion, the holding
has been, and probably will continue to be, expanded to uphold other
forms of religious tax exemptions. A very recent case which applied Walz
is Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miamni.75 In Diffenderfer, the
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Florida's property tax exemp-
tion to church-owned, commercially-operated parking lots, the proceeds of
which were used for charitable works.76  Although the plaintiff did not
challenge the exemption for the property upon which the church was
located,77 the three-judge district court, viewing Walz as the appropriate
precedent, upheld the parking lot exemption saying that "it is clear
that the limitation in the Walz opinion to property used exclusively for
religious worship was merely a mechanism to put the case in the posture
of dealing with the ultimate religious activity. 78 From this, the Diffender-
fer court reasoned that the use of church property for a "slightly less
religious purpose" did not create an establishment of religion.7 9 This
71. It is submitted, that this difficulty was a major influence in the Court's adop-
tion of the involvement standard and its abandonment of the advancement standard.
72. 397 U.S. at 674. The public or social welfare doctrine disavowed by the WalsCourt was first used to justify state sponsored busing of parochial school students
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). But see Murray v. Comptroller
of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966), where
the Maryland Supreme Court upheld property tax exemptions for religious institutions
on the public or social welfare doctrine. See generally R. DRINAN, note 6 supra.
73. 397 U.S. at 674.
74. See Giannella, note 52 supra at 550; Hurvich, 43 supra at 540.
75. F. Supp. __ 39 U.S.L.W. 2184 (Oct. 6, 1970) (S.D. Fla.). Several
other cases have also used the Walz decision; two invalidated state parochial school
aid statutes which provided for the purchase of secular education as in the Lemon
case. DiCenso v. Robinson, __ F. Supp. , 39 U.S.L.W. 2023 (June 15, 1970)(D.R.I.) ; Johnson v. Sanders, ___ F. Supp. , 39 U.S.L.W. 2225 (Oct. 15, 1970)(D. Conn.). One' decision upheld an identical statute. Opinion of Justices,
Mich.. , __ N.W.2d _, 39 U.S.L.W. 2224 (Oct. 5, 1970).76. Id.
77. Id. In Walz, the challenge was directed at the real estate and the building
erected thereon.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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decision, while not applying the secular purpose and primary effect test,
combined with Walz, would seem to create a strong precedent for justify-
ing other religious organization tax exemptions.
The exemption of religious organizations from federal income taxation
is one such important tax exemption granted to churches8s The Walz
Court expressed the view that this exemption "is an 'aid' to churches
no more and no less in principle than the real estate tax exemption
granted by States."81 While the Court's statement was only dictum, to
the extent that it suggests that the federal income tax exemption is con-
stitutional, it is unprecedented. However, since the Court has never ad-
dressed itself to the constitutionality of this exemption, it is submitted
that it lends little support to the Court's holding that state real estate
tax exemptions are constitutional.
To further support its holding, the Walz Court advanced the argu-
ment that since property tax exemptions are over two hundred years old
and have not led to an established religion, they must be constitutional. 82
While there does seem to be some validity to the major premise of this
argument - when a particular activity which has been in existence over
an extended period of time does not produce those evils intended to be
prevented, those evils should not be the basis for its proscription - it
loses its significance when considered in light of the fact that the purpose
for exemption was the protection of established religion.8 3
While some of the justifications put forth by the Court are not im-
pressive, the shift in the focus of the primary effect determination8 4 does
seem significant. The resolution of future problems,8 5 may depend upon
whether the Court, in applying the effect moiety of the "secular purpose
and primary effect" test, was utilizing a doctrinal" or a balancing ap-
proach8 7 either of which could be applied as a unitary test.88 If the
involvement standard is applied rigidly to all areas of religious establish-
ment, then the problems discussed previously concerning parochial aid
seem inevitable.8 9 However, if the involvement standard is to be im-
plemented through a balancing approach to determine the permissible
80. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501 et seq. exempts organizations operated ex-
clusively for religious purposes among others.
81. 397 U.S. at 676.
82. Id. at 676-77.
83. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
84. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
85. See text accompanying notes 46, 51 & 75 supra.
86. See, e.g., Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools,
56 CALIF. L. REV. 260 (1968); Giannella note 52 supra for a complete doctrinal
discussion.
87. See; e.g., P. .KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 105 (1964);
McCloskey, Principles, Powers and Values: The Establishment Clause and the
Supreme Court, in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC OrER 3 (D. Giannella ed. 1964).;
Valente, note 17 supra at.606.
.88. A unitary test is a single test under both religious clauses applicable to all
religious clause problems arising from governmental action. See note 17 and accom-
panying text supra.
89. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
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extent of financial aid, then the cases concerning parochial school aid
may be reconciled with the instant decision.
The Walz decision may be read to support a unitary test - whether
doctrinal9 or balancing 9 ' in nature. It may also be interpreted to further
the position that no one test is sufficient for all areas of religious estab-
lishment, and therefore, different tests should be applied to the various
problems. 2 The threshold question which still remains unanswered is
which of these approaches the Court will ultimately select.
Baldo M. Carnecchia, Jr.
LANDLORD AND TENANT - HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS - WAR-
RANTY OF HABITABILITY IS IMPLIED DURING THE ENTIRE TERM OF
A LEASE OF AN URBAN DWELLING - HOUSING CODE STANDARDS
MEASURE THE SCOPE OF THE WARRANTY.
Javins v. First National Realty Corp. (D.C. Cir. 1970)
Plaintiff, landlord, and defendants, tenants, entered into separate writ-
ten leases for residential apartments. After the commencement of the
leases certain Housing Code' violations arose, inhibiting defendants' en-
joyment of the leased property. Defendants refused to pay the monthly
rental installment and plaintiff brought suit in the Landlord and Tenant
Branch of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, seeking
possession of the property on grounds that defendants had defaulted in
the payment of rent. Defendants admitted that they had not made the
rental payments, alleging that, as a result of the Housing Code violations,
they were relieved of that obligation. The court refused defendants' offer
of proof -of the violations,2 reasoning that since they arose after the com-
90. See Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
91. Id.
92. See Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J.692 (1968).
1. Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia (1956), cited in Javins v.
First National Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072 n.1 [hereinafter referred to as the
Housing Code or Code]. The full scheme of the Washington, D.C., regulations is set
out in Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F,2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). TheHousing Code was established and authorized. by the Commissioners of the District
of Columbia on August 11, 1955. 2 D.C. Register 47 (1955), cited in 428 F.2d at
1080 n.50. Since that time, the Code has been updated by numerous orders of the
Commissioners. The seVenty-five pages of the regulations provide a comprehensive
regulitory scheme setting forth in some detail: (a) the standards which housing in the
District must meet; (b) which party,the lessor or the lessee, must meet each
standard; and (c) a system of inspections, notifications and criminal penalties.
. 2. This offer of proof was presented as "an equitable defense or a claim by way
of recoupment or set-off in an amount equal to the rent claim" as provided in the rules
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mencement of the lease, these infractions had no effect on defendants'
obligation to pay rent and entered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the
lower court.3 Defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, which reversed, holding that a continuing
warranty of habitability, measured by the standards set forth in the
Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia, is implied by operation
of law in leases of urban dwellings and a breach of the warranty gives
rise to remedies for breach of contract. Javins v. First National Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3224
(U.S. Nov. 24, 1970).
Traditionally, a lease has been treated as a conveyance of an interest
in land ;4 therefore, courts have generally resolved disputes over leases by
applying the rules which governed real property transactions.5 One sig-
nificant result of this position was that the doctrine of caveat emptor
8
applied. Thus, the tenant acquired the premises in their existing condition
and had a duty to inspect them before taking possession ;7 once in pos-
session, he assumed all responsibility for repair and maintenance.8 The
of the Court of General Sessions. Rule 4(c) of the Landlord and Tenant Branch of
the Court of General Sessions provides:
In suits in this branch for recovery of possession of property in which the basis of
recovery of possession is nonpayment of rent, tenants may set up an equitable
defense or claim by way of recoupment or set-off in an amount equal to the rent
claim. No counterclaim may be filed unless plaintiff asks for money judgment
for rent. The exclusion of prosecution of any claims in this branch shall be with-
out prejudice to the prosecution of any claims in other branches of the court.
Cited in 428 F.2d at 1073 n.3.
Appellants sought only to defeat the landlord's action upon a theory of breach
of contract. Under Rule 4(c) supra, they could not counterclaim for money damages
since the landlord sought only possession.
3. Saunders v. First National Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968),
rev'd sub nom. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1970).
4. 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 890, at 586-87 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1964).
5. See generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 3.1-.2 (A. Casner ed. 1968).
6. In La Freda v. Woodward, 125 N.J.L. 489, 492-93, 15 A.2d 798, 800 (1940),
it was stated that:
It is the established general rule in this state that, upon the letting of a house or
lands, there is no implied warranty or condition that the premises are fit and
suitable for the purpose specified, or for the use to which the lessee proposes
to devote them, or indeed for any purpose; and the landlord is therefore under
no liability for injuries sustained by the tenant, or his family, by reason of the
ruinous condition of the demised premises, unless there has been fraudulent
concealment of a latent defect. The doctrine of covenants implied from the letting
"has been held in great strictness in this State." The rule of caveat emptor
governs generally.
7. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). The court restated this
rule but held that a lease of a furnished house was a different situation in which there
was an implied agreement that the house was fit for immediate habitation.
8. 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 99 (3d ed. 1939). See Lawley
v. Capital Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1933) ; Briggs v. Pannaci, 106 N.J.L.
541, 150 A. 427 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930); Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. 429, 10 Am. R.
708 (1872).
Although this is the general rule, some courts have held that it is not appli-
cable to situations concerning short term leases of furnished dwellings. See I
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 3.45, at 267-68, and cases cited therein;
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focal point was that the land itself was the principal interest conveyed as
opposed to the buildings and improvements erected thereon.9
Another outgrowth of this rule was that the landlord's duties under
the lease were treated as independent from the tenant's. Thus, for ex-
ample, the breach of a specific covenant to repair by the landlord did
not absolve the tenant of his duty to pay rent, and was therefore not a
defense to the landlord's action for nonpayment of rent.'0
However, some recent opinions have broken with tradition by hold-
ing the lessor to implied warranties of habitability in housing leases."
see also Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 350, 31 N.E. 286 (1892), where, supporting
this exception, the court pointed out:
But there are good reasons why a different rule should apply to one who hires a
furnished room, or a furnished house, for a few days, or a few weeks or months.
Its fitness for immediate use of a particular kind, as indicated by its appointments,
is a far more important element entering into the contract than when there is a
mere lease of real estate. One who lets for a short term a house provided with
all furnishings and appointments for immediate residence may be supposed to con-
tract in reference to a well-understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habi-
tation. . . . It would be unreasonable to hold, under such circumstances, that the
landlord does not impliedly agree that what he is letting is a house suitable for
occupation in its condition at the time.
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), held that there is
an implied warranty of habitability when the subject of the lease is a furnished house.
The lessee's covenant to pay rent and the lessor's covenant to provide a habitable
house were held to be mutually dependent and thus a breach of the latter by the lessor
relieved the lessees of any liability under the former. This case is subject to con-
flicting interpretations, but the only Wisconsin Supreme Court case citing it, Earl
Millikin, Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d 497, 501, 124 N.W.2d 651, 654 (1963), cites Pines
for the proposition that Wisconsin will now generally imply a covenant of habitability,
at least in leases for less than three years. Conversely, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 630 (1962),
argues for a limited interpretation of Pines. The broad language in the opinion itself
suggests that the implied warranty the court established is not limited strictly to
any of the aforementioned exceptions.
Other cases, particularly those dealing with the doctrines of "quiet enjoyment"
and "constructive eviction," have recognized the invalidity of the "no-repair" rule.
See Gladden v. Walker & Dunlop, 168 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (landlord has duty
to maintain portions of apartment "under his control" including plumbing, heating and
electrical systems); J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930) (implied covenant of fitness held to exist in lease of building under construc-
tion), rev'd on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Steefel v.
Rothschild, 179 N.Y. 273, 72 N.E. 112 (1904) (duty to disclose latent defects). See
also 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 1 225[3] (1967).
9. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 3.11, at 203. See also
Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647). But see Graves v. Berdan,
26 N.Y. 498 (1863), which held that the urban tenant had no interest in the land,
but only in the attached building.
10. See Barry v. Frankini, 287 Mass. 196, 191 N.E. 651 (1934), where the court,
on grounds that the covenants in the lease were independent, held that the landlord's
breach of a covenant to pay taxes did not justify a cancellation of the lease; Stone v.
Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938), held that mutual covenants in a
lease were independent and thus, the breach of a covenant to "make outside repairs"
by the landlord did not excuse the tenant from paying rent; Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.
App. 2d 54, 179 P.2d 41 (1947), where it was held that the landlord's covenant to
repair and the tenant's covenant to pay rent were independent if the covenant to repair
was not a condition precedent to paying the rent.
11. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, _, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969),
which held that in a lease of a dwelling house there existed an implied warranty of
habitability and fitness for the use intended. The court stated:
[A] lease is, in essence, a sale as well as a transfer of an estate in land and is,
more importantly, a contractual relationship. From that contractual relationship
an implied warranty ... is a just and necessary implication.
See also Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969), noted in 31
U. PxTT. L. REv. 138 (1969), following Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d
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These cases have proceeded upon the rationale that the lease was a con-
tractual agreement and an implied warranty arose from the terms of the
lease itself.12 However, none of these cases has specifically relied upon
housing codes as the basis for a continuing implied warranty, 18 although
these and other cases14 do indicate that the courts view housing codes
and the legislative intent behind them as having a significant effect upon
the landlord-tenant relationship. These codes are seemingly an appropriate
basis for a continuing implied warranty since they generally require
that essentials such as heating, lighting, ventilation and plumbing facilities
with adequate sewage disposal be installed and properly maintained.'
5
Furthermore, most codes have established maintenance and cleanliness
409 (1961). The Reste court held that there was, at the inception of the original lease,
an implied warranty against latent defects. See generally 45 MARQ. L. REv. 630, supra
note 8.
12. The court in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 455, 251 A.2d 268,
274 (1969), stated that "at the inception of the original lease in the present case, an
implied warranty against latent defects existed."
13. Cf. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 835 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), which,
although not utilizing the Housing Code for a continuing implied warranty, did hold
that the Housing Code imposed certain obligations upon the landlord prior to the
commencement of the term of the lease.
14. Several cases have held housing codes and municipal ordinances to be integral
parts of leases executed when these regulations were in effect. Brown v. Southall
Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). An analogous case is Whetzel v.
Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960), noted in 10 CATH. U.L.
REV. 44 (1961), where the landlord failed to keep the premises repaired as required
by the Housing Code and the tenant was seriously injured as a result. The tenant
sued in tort and the court held that the Housing Code imposed a duty of care upon
the landlord which he violated and was therefore liable. See also National Bank of
Washington v. Dixon, 301 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1961), where the landlord was held
liable for conditions which existed in violation of the District of Columbia Housing
Regulations and which caused injury; Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538,
165 N.E.2d 286 (1960) ; Leuthold v. Stikney, 116 Minn. 299, 133 N.W. 856 (1911),
which held that the owner of a building who, during the term of the lease thereof,
fails to equip such building with fire escapes in violation of a local ordinance, cannot
maintain an action upon such lease for rent.
15. See, e.g., High Point, N.C., Ordinance Providing for the Repair or Elimina-
tion of Unfit Housing and Dangerous Building Conditions §§ 6(a), (b) (4) (Dec. 13,
1954), and Pittsburgh, Pa., Housing Code, Ordinance No. 122, §§ 741-61 (1954),
cited in Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1115, 1116 n.12 & 13
(1956); Philadelphia Pa., Housing Code §§ 7-302, 7-304-06 (1956).
Despite these codes, some courts have failed to see the contradiction with
public policy considerations in forcing a tenant to continue to pay rent when he is
surrounded by living conditions which violate minimum housing code standards. Hence,
effective protection for the tenant has been lacking because of judicial hesitancy to
incorporate the standards established in the codes into the terms of the lease agreement.
In Saunders v. First National Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to allow the landlord's violation of
housing regulations to be a defense to his action for possession based on nonpayment
of rent. While the ultimate solution to the urban housing problem lies in demolition,
clearance and new construction, the slow rate of this housing replacement makes
enforcement of housing codes essential to preserve decent housing. Gribetz & Grad,
Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUm. L. REV. 1254, 1257(1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801
(1965); Note, Private Enforcement of Municipal Housing Regulations, 54 IowA L.
REv. 580, 581 (1969). "
Since World War II at least fifty cities have adopted housing codes designed
for comprehensive and effective regulation of occupancy and facilities in existing
housing. Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1115, .1116 .(1956)..
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standards for buildings including elimination of vermin, rodents and
other unsanitary conditions.'"
The courts in the District of Columbia have placed great emphasis
on the scheme promulgated by the Housing Regulations. In Whetzel v.
Jess Fisher Management Co., 17 it was held that the Housing Code altered
the common law and placed a duty to repair upon the landlord. Thus, a
tenant, injured by a breach of this duty, had a cause of action against
the landlord. Affirming this position in a later case, the court stated that
"the Housing Regulations did impose maintenance obligations upon ap:
pellee [landlord] which he was not free to ignore.' 8
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals gave the Housing Regu-
lations broader efficacy in Brown v. Southall Realty Co.19 In this case
violations of the District of Columbia Housing Code, which were known
to the landlord, existed at the commencement of the lease term. The
court, reasoning that the basic validity of every housing contract depends
upon substantial compliance with the Housing Code at the beginning
of the lease term,20 held that these conditions, which rendered the housing
"unsafe and unsanitary", voided the lease as an illegal contract.
The court in the instant case placed great reliance upon the rationale
adopted in Brown, ruling that since serious failure to comply with the
Code2 ' prior to the commencement of the lease term renders the contract
void, it is a logical extension to hold that the regulations impose a con-
tinuing obligation upon the landlord to maintain the premises during
the lease term. 22  This position necessarily incorporates the Housing
Code into the lease and makes it an integral part of the agreement. Judge
Wright 28 attempted to justify this stand by observing that the incorpora-
tion of relevant law is a practice adopted by courts in an attempt to con-
16. E.g., Philadelphia, Pa., Housing Code § 7-301-03 (1956).
17. 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The court followed the leading case of Altz
v. Lieberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922). Judge Cardozo stated in Lieberson
that:
We may be sure that the framers of this statute, when regulating tenement life,
had uppermost in thought the care of those who are unable to care for themselves.
The legislature must have known that unless repairs in the rooms of the poor
were made by the landlord, they would not be made by any one. The duty imposed
became commensurate with the need. The right to seek redress is not limited
to the city or its officers. The right extends to all whom there was a purpose
to protect.
233 N.Y. at 19, 134 N.E. at 704.
18. Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
19. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
20. 428 F.2d at 1081.
21. Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia § 2501, cited in 428 F.2d
at 1081, provides that:
Every premises accommodating one or more habitations shall be maintained and
kept in repair so as to provide decent living accommodations for the occupants.
This part of this Code contemplates more than mere basic repairs and maintenance
to keep out the elements; its purpose is to include- repairs and maintenance
designed to make a premises or neighborhood healthy and safe.
22. 428 F.2d at 1081.
23. Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote the opinion for the three judge panel
in the instant case.
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strue contracts in accordance with the intent of the parties. 24 Moreover,
it was said that public policy would seem to demand a similar result.2 5
Finally, reasoning that the goals of the Housing Code itself require that
it be incorporated into the contract,26 the court concluded that since the
legislative intent behind the Code was to place a duty upon the landlord
to maintain his housing units in a livable condition, it would be incon-
sistent with the purpose of the Code to follow the old rule of no implied
warranties and not require the landlord to make repairs once the tenant
has taken possession.
2 7
Although not mentioned by the court, the existence of the Housing
Code is important for another reason since it removed the necessity for
the court to balance the respective interests of the landlord and tenant.
Congress, in enacting the Code, made a judgment as to the proper al-
location of responsibilities of the parties 28 and the court was not free to
question the propriety of this allocation. Absent such legislation, it is
submitted that it would have been incumbent upon the court to weigh
the interests of the parties before reaching its conclusion.
24. As the court in Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 544, 165 N.E2d
286, 290 (1960), stated:
[Tihe law existing at the time and place of the making of the contract is deemed
a part of the contract as though expressly referred to or incorporated in it ...
The rationale for this rule is that the parties to the contract would have expressed
that which the law implies "had they not supposed that it was unnecessary to
speak of it because the law provided for it." . . . Consequently, the courts, in
construing the existing law as part of the express contract, are not reading into
the contract provisions different from those expressed and intended by the parties,
as defendants contend, but are merely construing the contract in accordance with
the intent of the parties.
Schiro held that a contract to sell and purchase land and construct a building thereon
included, as an integral part, relevant provisions of a city code in existence at the time
the contract was executed, and violations of this code by the vendor were tantamount
to a breach of contract which entitled the purchaser to specific performance of the
contract with an abatement out of the purchase money for the breach.
25. The Javins court stated that:
As a general proposition, it is undoubtedly true that the parties to a contract
intend that applicable law will be complied with by both sides. We recognize,
however, that reading statutory provisions into private contracts may have little
factual support in the intentions of the particular parties now before us. But, for
reasons of public policy, warranties are often implied into contracts by operation
of law in order to meet generally prevailing standards of honesty and fair
dealing. When the public policy has been enacted into law like the housing code,
that policy will usually have deep roots in the expectations and intentions of
most people.
428 F.2d at 1081 n.26. See also Costigan, Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual
Assent, 33 HARV. L. REv. 376, 383-85 (1920).
26. In Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court stated
tltat :
The housing and sanitary codes, especially in light of Congress' explicit direction
for their enactment, indicate a strong and pervasive congressional concern to secure
for the city's slum dwellers decent, or at least safe and sanitary, places to live.
27. The court in Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13
(1961), took the same position. The Court said that:
[Tihe legislature has made a policy judgment - that it is socially (and
politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property owner - which has
rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied
warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the
current legislative policy concerning housing standards.
28. Cf. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
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However, as the court conceded,2 9 parts of its rationale are tenuous.
Specifically, the court's presumption of incorporation might be rebutted
by inquiry into the actual intent of the parties. It is submitted that the
court could have effected the same result by taking the position that the
lease is a contract for sale,30 an implied warranty arises from such a
transaction,31 and the Housing Code, insofar as it imposes positive re-
quirements upon the landlord, delineates the parameters of this warranty.
In this way the intent of both parties to be bound by the provisions of
the Housing Code would be more clearly recognized. Extensive dicta
by the Javins court indicates that it might be amenable to such a sugges-
tion.3 2 Moreover, this solution would not be repugnant to prior District
of Columbia law.3
3
Despite its methodology, the court's incorporation of the Housing
Code into the lease manifests the importance of these codes and their use
as an effective measure for the protection of the tenant. It is submitted
that a private right of action under the Code gives the tenant the only
effective method of enforcement, for if left to government agencies, the
full impact of the Code would not be realized.34 The tenant is logically
the proper party to enforce the Code since he is directly affected by its
operation and has a manifest interest in the proper maintenance of the
dwelling. Significantly, the court ruled that the tenant's right of action
is not predicated upon an official inspection or finding of violations by
the city government. 5 At least three results evolve from this ruling:
(1) the tenant can defend against a dispossession action by an unsub-
stantiated allegation of code violations; (2) the housing authority will
not be burdened by numerous demands for inspections which might ensue
from a contrary position; and (3) the effectiveness of the Code will be
enhanced by these tenant actions in which the tenant will become, in
effect, a private housing inspector.
Although not an issue in the instant case, it seems clear that the
court's position does not permit the landlord to waive or shift his duty
29. See note 25 supra.
30. In Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 836 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968),
the court stated:[W]e consider the allegation that the trial court erred in failing to declare the
lease agreement void as an illegal contract both meritorious and completely dis-
positive, and for this reason we reverse.
31. CI. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, which provides in pertinent part:(1) Unless excluded or modified ... . a warranty that the goods shall be mer-
chantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind....
See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
32. See p. 393 infra.
33. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C Cir. 1968); Diamond Hous-
ing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969) ; Brown v. Southall Realty
Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
34. See Gribetz & Grad, supra note 15, at 1255-56.
35. 428 F.2d at 1082 n.62, citing Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d
492, 494 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
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by agreement. 86 His obligations are imposed by the Code, which per-
mits no transfer of obligatory duties.3 7 In addition, it was intimated
that since public policy requires that warranties be implied into contracts
to obtain honesty and fair dealing,38 it would be unfair to allow the
landlord to disclaim such a warranty, nor would the court uphold such
a disclaimer.8 9
Although the Javins court based its holding upon the Housing Code
and a protraction of existing District of Columbia law, it also engaged
in extensive dicta. The threshold question is whether this dicta repre-
sents an alternative rationale for the court's decision. Since the exten-
sion of prior District of Columbia law does not appear illogical or
strained, it can be argued that the dicta is a precursor to a new direc-
tion in District of Columbia law.40
The basis of the court's supplemental rationale was that "the com-
mon law itself must recognize the landlord's obligation to keep his prem-
ises in a habitable condition." 4 1 Three principal arguments were em-
ployed in support of this premise: (1) that certain factual assumptions
upon which the "no-repair" rule rested are no longer viable; (2) that
recent consumer protection cases require that a new rule be adopted in
order to interpose those principles into landlord and tenant law; and
(3) that the current status of the housing market commands the relin-
quishment of the old rule.
In defining the predicate of the "no-repair" rule, the Javins court
recognized that to the tenant in an agrarian society, the land itself was
the most important aspect of the leasehold. 42  In sharp contrast, the
tenant of today seeks no such interest in the land; rather he seeks only
"shelter", 48 i.e. "a house suitable for occupation. '44 This position accepts
the argument that the modern urban community does not contemplate
that the tenant make repairs himself since, in general, he does not possess
36. 428 F.2d at 1081-82 & n.58. The court stated that any private agreement to
shift the duties would be illegal and unenforceable, citing Narramore v. Cleveland, C.,
C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 96 F. 298, 302 (6th Cir. 1899).37. The court stated that if the Code specifically placed the duties with the land-
lord, any private, agreement to shift these duties would be illegal and unenforceable.
428 F.2d at 1081.
38. See note 25 supra.
39. There was a provision in the written lease which governed repairs but the
court refused to consider it, ruling that the implied warranty of the landlord could
not be excluded. 428 F.2d at 1080 n.49. Cf. Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305, 306 (D.C.
Cir. 1946) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
40. Significantly, the court cited the Javins opinion in Kline v. 1500 Massachu-
setts Avenue Apartment Corp., --- F.2d -, -_ (D.C. Cir. 1970), as controlling
authority for the position enunciated in the dicta rather than its explicit holding.
41. 428 F.2d at 1077 (emphasis added).
,42. Id., citing 2,F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 131
.(2d ed. 1898).
43. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDIIG THE
AMERICAN CITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COMMISSION]. The extensive
standards set out in the District of 'Columbia Housihg' Regulatiorns provide a guide to
community expectations.
44. 428 F.2d at 1078. See also Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant:
Proposal for Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519, 535-36 (1966).
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the ability, means, or motivation to do so. 45  Furthermore, it can be
argued that the assumption that the landlord is a landowner is not en-
tirely descriptive of his real status. The modern landlord is more like
an investor seeking a return on his capital. Seen in this light, the "no-
repair" rule placed the duty of maintenance upon the party with the least
interest in preservation of the investment.
The second argument advanced by the Javins court significantly
placed the tenant on an equal footing with consumers who purchase
goods on the open market. The court, analogizing a lease contract to a
sale of goods, looked upon the landlord as the "seller" of a "product."
It is submitted that the real reason for imposing a warranty in a lease
is the similarity of factors which justify such imposition in sales cases.
Among these common factors are: (1) public policy, which dictates
that parties who place products on a market should properly bear re-
sponsibility for defects therein; (2) one party has induced another's
reliance upon his superior skill and knowledge; (3) the party inducing
reliance is in a better position to know and control the quality of his
product; and (4) that party is generally better able to absorb the loss
which flows from the defect.46 The court, in Javins, relied heavily upon
45. 428 F.2d at 1078-79.
46. Contract law principles pertaining to warranties have developed rigid stand-
ards of responsibility upon the seller in an attempt to protect the consuming public.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), and comments thereto;
Witherspoon, Torts or Warranties?, 73 Com. L.J. 134 (1968); Comment, Implied
Warranty, Strict Liability for Personal Injuries, and the Uniform Commercial Code,
Section 2-318, 13 KAN. L. REv. 411 (1965) ; Comment, Products Liability: Implied
Warranties, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 139 (1964) ; Note, Liability for Negligent Automobile
Design, 52 IOWA L. REv. 953 (1967). See generally Jaeger, Product Liability: The
Constructive Warranty, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 501 (1964); Prosser, The Assault
upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). The
courts have also sought to protect the legitimate expectations of the purchaser and
to broaden the responsibilities of the seller to stand behind his representations of the
quality of his goods by utilizing implied warranties of fitness and merchantability.
This is due to the unfair bargaining position of the seller and the consumer's lack of
ability or opportunity to inspect the product. A merchant, in the absence of any
agreement, is thus held to warrant that his goods are fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are intended and that they are of at least reasonably adequate
quality, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314. In addition, where the seller at the
time of contracting has reason to know any, particular purpose for which the goods
are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select
or furnish suitable goods there is an implied warranty that the goods be fit for such
purpose. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315. See generally Blackburn, Warranties
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 ARB. J. 173 (1967); Jaeger, Warranties
of Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. REV.
493 (1962); Kock, Seller's Responsibility For His Goods Under the Uniform Com-
merkcial Code, 41 N.D.L. REV. 24 (1964) ; Lauer, Sales Warranties Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 Mo. L. REv. 259 (1965); Comment, The Contractual Aspects
of Consumer Protection: Recent Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64
MicH. L. REV. 1430 (1966); Note, 20 S.C.L. REv. 323 (1968).
However, in Kearse v. Spaulding, 406 Pa. 140, 176 A.2d 450 (1962), the
court found that the Philadelphia Housing Code was not incorporated in the lease
agreement as terms and conditions of the lease, and an alleged failure to observe the
Code did not' give rise to an action for breach thereof. But see Lovaso v. Custom Built
Homes, Inc., 144 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 1962), where a builder was held liable for
defects which were the result of faulty construction. Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction,
has implied warranties of quality in both the sale of real and personal property. In
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965),
noted in-54 Gmo. L.J. 1017 (1966), 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1002 (1966) and 11 VILL. L.
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the reliance aspect. It is submitted that the reliance of the buyer of a
"product" upon his "seller" is an important factor to be considered in
determining the existence and extent of the latter's obligations.
The court's final argument was motivated by public policy consid-
erations. Judge Wright noted the inequality of bargaining power which
exists between the landlord and tenant 47 and reasoned that, at present,
the tenant has little means to enforce demands for better housing.4 The
landlord is able to place the tenants in a "take it or leave it" situation
by employing various impediments to competition in the housing market
such as racial and class distinction 49 and standard form leases. 50 These
factors, coupled with the increasingly severe shortage of adequate hous-
ing,51 radically diminish the tenant's bargaining position. It is submitted
that, although not sufficiently persuasive in themselves to justify im-
position of a warranty, these arguments clearly support the court's goal
of ameliorating the inequities involved in allowing landlords to force
tenants into accepting substandard housing.
REV. 404 (1966), the court held that a leasing agreement gave rise to a continuing
implied promissory warranty that leased trucks would be fit for plaintiff's employer's
use for the duration of the lease; Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B.
113, appears to have originated the exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor in the
sale of real property. Plaintiff-vendee contracted to buy a new house from the builder-
vendor. Structural defects later appeared and vendee sued. The court held the vendor
liable for a breach of an implied warranty of fitness for habitation; Bearman, Caveat
Emptor in the Sale of Realty - Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV.
541 (1961); Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land For a Particular
Purpose, 37 MINN. L. REV. 108 (1953); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality
in Non-sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. Rxv. 653 (1957); Haskell, The Case For an
Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965);
Nielsen, Caveat Emptor in the Sales of Real Property - Time For a Reappraisal,
10 ARiz. L. REV. 484 (1968); Note, 44 N.C.L. REv. 236 (1965).
Some recent decisions and commentary have also suggested the extension of
liability to persons other than the immediate seller for improper construction of resi-
dential real estate. Conner v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850,
447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (en banc). Chief Justice Traynor's excellent
opinion utilizes tort doctrines to extend liability beyond the immediate seller;
Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New Housing,
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1968).
47. 428 F.2d at 1079. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
See also PowELL, supra note 8, f 221[1], at 183; PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN
HOUSING, A DECENT HOME (1968) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE];
Note, Landlord and Tenant - Retalhatory Evictions, 3 HARv. Cirv. RIGHTS L. Rxv.
193 (1968) ; 26 MD. L. REv. 200 (1966).
48. For discussion on this problem, see Tenant's Rights - Legal Tools for
Better Housing, Report on a National Conference on Legal Rights of Tenants (1967) ;
Sax & Heistand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 869 (1967); Comment,
Rent Abatement Legislation: An Answer to Landlords, 12 VILL. L. REV. 631 (1967) ;
Note, Recent Legislation, Abatement of Rent in New York, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 490(1966); but see Blum and Dunham, Slumlordism as a Tort - A Dissenting View,
66 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1968) and in response, Sax, Slumlordism as a Tort - A Brief
Response, 66 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1968).
49. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, supra note 47, at 96; G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT
LANDLORD at 70-71 (1966). See generally Martin, Segregation of Residences ot
Negroes, 32 MICH. L. REV. 721 (1934) ; McGhee and Ginger, The House I live in -
A Study of Housing for Minorities, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 194 (1961).
50. See POWELL, supra note 8, 1 221[l], at 183 n.13. See also Comment, Standard
Form Leases in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 583.
51. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, supra note 47; J. LEvI, P. HABLUTZEL,
L. ROSENBERG & J. WHITE, MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD - TENANT CODE 6-7(Tent. Draft 1969); A. SCHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY (1963).
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The social impact of poorly maintained or inadequate housing mili-
tates in favor of readjusting the allocation of responsibilities in the land-
lord and tenant relationship. The Javins court, through its dicta, has
posited a reasonable method for obtaining this result. By viewing the lease
of an urban dwelling unit purely as a contractual agreement, the court
has moved to the forefront in the trend toward a proper balancing of
landlord-tenant interests.
Since the case was remanded for further proceedings in the lower
court, guidelines were established for the finder of fact to use in deter-
mining whether or not a judgment for possession will be granted to the
landlord if he brings an action for failure to pay rent.52 While it may
be rather simple for the trier of fact to determine whether violations in
fact existed, the question of pro tanto suspension of the obligation to
pay the full amount of the rent, it is submitted, forces the finder of fact
to speculate. Early cases may yield widely divergent results because
there will be no articulated standard for determining the amount of rent
to be abated for any particular violation.53 In addition, the court re-
quired that two additional factors be considered by the finder of fact.
First, that the violations be substantial enough to affect the habitability
of the dwelling before an abatement of rent is justified. Second, that the
violations have not been caused by any wrongful act of the tenant
himself.5 4
The court took pains to emphasize that its holding extended to the
tenant all the existing remedies for breach of contract. Thus, tenants
are not limited to a defensive use of the warranty, but rather, can take
the initiative and demand, among others, the two important remedies
of specific performance and set-off. This option constitutes a superior
alternative to that which was heretofore available. Formerly, the tenant
was obliged, under the doctrine of constructive eviction,55 to vacate
52. The finder of fact must establish:(1) whether the alleged violations existed during the period for which past
due rent is claimed, and (2) what portion, if any or all, of the tenant's obligation
to pay rent was suspended by the landlord's breach. If no part of the tenant's
rental obligation is found to have been suspended, then a judgment for possession
may issue forthwith. On the other hand, if the jury determines that the entire
rental obligation has been extinguished by the landlord's total breach, then the
action for possession on the ground of nonpayment must fail. The jury may find
that part of the tenant's rental obligation has been suspended but that part of the
unpaid back rent is indeed owed to the landlord. In these circumstances, nojudgment for possession should issue if the tenant agrees to pay the partial rent
found to be due. If the tenant refuses to pay the partial amount, a judgment for
possession may then be entered.
428 F.2d at 1082-83.
53. However, in time a schedule for abatement may evolve which might be
predicated upon the essential nature of the lost service.
54. 428 F.2d at 1082 n.62. It is interesting to note that the court, in allowing the
landlord to defend by proving the damage was caused by the tenant's own malicious
action, employed the contract principle that no one may benefit from his own wrong
rather than a concept of tortious conduct. Two results that will obtain from this
position are that the complexity of counterclaims will be mitigated and questions forjury determination simplified.
55. See 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 461, for a discussion of this doctrine.
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the premises if he desired relief. This remedy was often contrary to the
tenant's real aim - the repair of the defects. Under the Javins holding,
the tenant's possessory interest in the leased premises is protected as
well as his interest in a livable dwelling. The importance of this de-
velopment cannot be minimized when viewed in the context of the urban
housing shortage.
The instant case is also significant because it treats covenants in
the lease as mutually dependent promises. If the premises falls below
the Housing Code standards the landlord has not fulfilled his contractual
obligation and, since the tenant's obligation to pay rent is contingent
upon such performance, his remedies for breach arise, and a defense to
an eviction action is made out. An important consequence of this rule
is that the tenant can invoke the powerful tool of rent abatement or
"rent strike". Although this practice is permitted by statute in some
jurisdictions,56 it is usually limited to conditions which are "hazardous
to life, health or safety of the occupants."5 7 A possible weakness exists
in this remedy, however, for if the tenant fails to show any housing
code violations, he is subject to eviction for nonpayment of rent. This
untoward result could be avoided, however, if the tenant were to place
the rent in escrow. 58 In this fashion the tenant can both protect himself
from eviction and, if his complaint as to the violations is legitimate, abate
the rent.
Although a rent strike is generally an effective measure, it is ques-
tionable whether it can solve the problems of substandard housing, for
there is some uncertainty as to whether this measure will force the
landlord to make the necessary repairs, which is the goal sought by the
tenant. The landlord may be dilatory in making the repairs, or may
refuse to make them at all.59
The impact of the instant case should be great because the landlord
is bound to a continuing obligation of proper maintenance of his dwell-
ings. This undoubtedly will cause some landlords to cease operations
due to financial inability to effect the repairs which some units will re-
quire in order to comport with Code standards. Compliance with the
56. See NEW YORK REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 755 (McKinney 1963), which provides
that, upon proof that an order to make repairs or to cease a violation has been made
by the appropriate supervisory department and, in the opinion of the court, the viola-
tion amounts to constructive eviction, the tenant can defend against an action for
rent by obtaining a court order which stays eviction proceedings. The tenant must
have paid the rent into court to obtain this order, but only after the violations have
been dismissed will the landlord receive the rent due. This statute has been sustained
after attack in Emray Realty Corp. v. De Stefano, 5 Misc. 2d 352, 160 N.Y.S.2d 433(Sup. Ct. 1957). Cf. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1970).
57. NEW YORK REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 769 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70), which
provides for control of conditions in multiple dwellings which endanger the "life,
health, or safety" of the occupants.
58. The court, recognizing that this practice is advisable as a protective measure,
stated that the escrowed money represents the rent for the time between the filing of
suit and the trial. It is submitted that, in order to insure against eviction, the money
should be deposited from the initial nonpayment to the final determination.
59. This becomes a greater possibility when the repairs are substantial in nature.
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Code may also have the effect, in some cases, of raising rents to offset
the cost of these repairs. On the other hand, until an established pat-
tern emerges, some tenants may be able to resist payment of rent on
spurious grounds. Notwithstanding these factors,60 the court in the
instant case has given the tenant some long overdue judicial assistance.
Jonathan L. Wesner
LANDLORD AND TENANT - IMPLIED WARRANTY - LANDLORD
WARRANTS THAT THE VITAL FACILITIES OF AN APARTMENT ARE
IN A LIVABLE CONDITION; IF THE LANDLORD FAILS TO SO MAIN-
TAIN THE PREMISES, THE TENANT MAY OFFSET THE COST OF
REPAIRS AGAINST THE RENT DUE.
Marini v. Ireland (N.J. 1970)
Plaintiff, landlord, and defendant, tenant, entered into a residential
lease agreement calling for the rent to be paid in monthly installments
of $95. The lease incorporated a covenant of quiet enjoyment, but did
not contain a specific covenant to repair. Approximately three months
after defendant took possession of the property, she discovered that the
plumbing fixtures were faulty, thereby causing water to leak onto the
bathroom floor. After repeated futile attempts to so inform the land-
lord, defendant hired a plumber to correct the condition, undertaking
the cost of the repairs herself. When the next installment of rent came
due, defendant deducted the cost of the repairs and forwarded to plaintiff
the remaining balance plus her receipt for the repair bill. Plaintiff chal-
lenged the offsetting of the rent and demanded that the rent be paid in full.
When his demands were not met, plaintiff instituted a summary dis-
possess action pursuant to N.J. REVISED STATUTE § 2A:18-531 for non-
payment of rent in the Camden County District Court. Plaintiff, assert-
ing that he had no duty to make repairs, alleged that he was entitled
to the outstanding rent. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and
defendant appealed to the appellate division which granted a temporary
stay of judgment for possession and ordered the defendant to pay all the
60. It should also be noted that the tenant may still be faced with the possibility
of eviction for reasons other than nonpayment of rent. See Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
1. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:18-53 (1951), provides in pertinent part:
Any leasee or tenant ... may be removed from such premises by the county
district court of the county within which such premises are situated, in an action
in the following cases:
b) Where such person shall hold over after default in the payment of rent,
pursuant to the agreement under which the premises are held.
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rent due except the amount contested pending appeal. Before the ap-
pellate division heard argument, the Supreme Court of New Jersey cer-
tified the case on its own motion. The Supreme Court reversed the dis-
trict court holding inter alia2 that a landlord, in a lease agreement for a
residential dwelling, warrants that the vital facilities of those premises
are in a livable condition at the commencement of the lease, and that he
will maintain them as such throughout the lease period. Upon the
landlord's failure to so maintain the premises, the tenant may, after noti-
fication of the defect, and time to remedy it has been afforded the land-
lord, either vacate the premises,3 or have the defect repaired and offset
the cost against the rent due. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A. 2d
526 (1970).
Under New Jersey statute, the tenant's right to appeal from an ad-
verse judgment in a summary disposses action is limited to the issue of
jurisdiction.4 The recent decision of Peters v. Kelly5 denied appellate
2. The court also held that the district court must consider equitable as well as
legal defenses offered by the tenant as an excuse for nonpayment of rent; and that
the lessee has a right to appeal the disposition of the district court since her allegation
that there is no default in rent even though it has not been paid, goes to the question
of jurisdiction. This ruling is important in New Jersey since in that state there can
be no appeal from a summary dispossess action unless it is based on lack of jurisdiction
in the district court. This limited appeal is provided for by N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A :18-59
(1951), which provides:
Proceedings had by virtue of this article shall not be appealable except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. The landlord, however, shall remain liable in a
civil action for unlawful proceedings brought under this article.
3. Vacation of the premises is the traditional remedy of the tenant when faced
with a constructive eviction. See Duncan Development Co. v. Duncan Hardware,
Inc., 34 N.J. Super. 293, 112 A.2d 274 (1955) ; Weiss v. I. Zapinsky, Inc., 65 N.J.
Super. 351, 167 A.2d 802 (1961) ; Boreel v. Lawton, 90 N.Y. 293 (1882) ; 300 West
56th St. Corp. v. Kelly, 153 N.Y.S.2d 978 (App. Div. 1956); Electronic Corp. of
America v. Famous Realty, 87 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T.), aff'd, 275 App.
Div. 859, 89 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1949).
4. An action by landlords for summary dispossession was made possible in1847 by the New Jersey Legislature through enactment of N.J. Pamph. L. 1847,
p. 142, as amended N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:18-51-61 (1951). The provisions of the
original statute were substantially similar to that of the current statute. For perti-
nent text of the act, see note 1 supra. The purpose of the statute was to give the
landlord a quick remedy for possession through a summary proceeding and to avoid
physical conflict. See McGann v. La Brecque Co., 91 N.J. Eq. 307, 109 A. 501 (1920),
wherein it was stated:
When the Legislature in 1847 enacted the statute providing for summary proceed-
ings by a landlord to obtain possession of his property, its evident object was to
settle speedily the right of the immediate possession by a judicial proceeding,
and thereby avoid actual physical conflict the occurrence of which had made
necessary the statutes relating to forcible entry and detainer.
To make the remedy effective, a swift and final decision was imperative, thus appellate
review was barred, and the tenant was remitted to an action in trespass for any
unlawful proceedings under the act. This was accomplished by N.J. Pamph. L. 1847,
p. 143, § 7, as amended N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:18-59 (1951), which provided in
pertinent part:
That the proceedings had by virtue of this act shall not be appealed from or
removed by certiorari; but the landlord shall remain liable in an action of
trespass for any unlawful proceedings under this act.
If the tenant did bring an action pursuant to N.J. Pamph. L. 1847, p. 143, § 7, thejudgment rendered in the possessory action had no binding effect upon the merits of
the action in trespass.
The judiciary was never favorably disposed to the absence of appellate
review over the district courts' disposition and eventually held that the legislature
could not curb the inherent authority of the courts to review at least the jurisdiction
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review where the basis for appeal was couched in equitable doctrines.
The Peters court reasoned that equitable defenses, offered to excuse or
avoid the duty to pay rent, went to the merits of the case rather than to
the jurisdiction of the court and hence, there could be no appeal. Thus,
the seemingly incongruous result was that once jurisdiction had been
established, the judgment must be affirmed, notwithstanding the possi-
bility of substantive error in the district court's disposition of the case. 6
The statute, together with the limitation imposed by Peters, served to
greatly restrict the tenant's ability to justify any nonpayment of rent. 7
Until recently, most courts took the position that a lease agreement
was a conveyance of a possessory interest in land and therefore property
law governed the rights and duties of those who had become parties to
such an agreement.8 One significant result of this position was that the
tenant was subject to the doctrine of caveat emptor9 and was thus barred
of the lower tribunals and thus the proceedings became reviewable to that extent. SeeVineland Shopping Center, Inc. v. DeMarco, 35 N.J. 459, 173 A.2d 270 (1961). The
following cases are authority for appellate review of the jurisdiction of the district
courts in summary dispossess actions: Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v. DeMarco,
35 N.J. 459, 173 A.2d 270 (1961) ; Opalach v. Cebulah, 2 N.J. Super. 139, 65 A.2d 67(1949); Montalvo v. Levinston, 94 N.J.L. 87, 110 A. 128 (1920); Fowler v. Row,
25 N.J.L. 549 (Sup. Ct. 1856). Thus, in order for the tenant to be able to appeal the
decision of the district court, it is necessary to show that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. This is stipulated in N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:18-59 (1951).
For full text of the act, see note 2 supra.
An alternative method of obtaining appellate review is removal of the cause
to the superior court. Removal is provided for in N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A :18-60 (1951),
which provides:
At any time before an action for the removal of a tenant comes on for trial, either
the landlord or person in possession may apply to the superior court, which may,if it deems it of sufficient importance, order the cause transferred from the county
district court to the superior court....
If removal is granted, appeal from the superior court is not limited to jurisdictional
questions. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:18-61 (1951).
5. 98 N.J. Super. 441, 237 A.2d 635 (1968).
6. Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v. DeMarco, 35 N.J. 459, 173 A.2d 270 (1961).In this case the court discussed at length the limited appeal available from a summary
dispossess action. The natural consequence of allowing an appeal only on questions
relating to the jurisdiction of the district court is the necessity of affirming the district
court regardless of substantive error if jurisdiction has been properly secured.
7. However, it must be kept in mind that the tenant's plight was partially com-
pensated for by his statutory right to bring a civil action against the landlord for an
unlawful summary dispossess action. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:18-59 (1951). For full
text of the act, see note 2 supra.
8. Prior to the 16th century contract principles were applied to lease agree-
ments. See generally 1 AMERICA-q LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
Another rationale offered for the application of property law to lease agreements is
that lease agreements developed prior to the concept of independent covenants.
Whether the covenants each party has agreed to perform are enforced as dependent
or independent has a substantial influence on the rights of the parties is discussed
at note 39 and accompanying text infra. See generally 1 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952) ; 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (3d ed. 1962).
9. The literal interpretation of the term caveat emptor is "let the buyer beware."
The landlord is therefore relieved of liability for defective conditions of the premises
because the tenant, through the doctrine of caveat emptor, has been put on notice thathe takes the premises in their existing condition. See Davidson v. Fischer, 11 Colo.
583, 19 P. 652 (1888) ; Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922) ; Franklin
v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889); Levine v. McClenathan, 246 Pa. 374,
92 A. 317 (1914).
Over the years, only two significant exceptions developed in an otherwise
strict adherence to the common law principle of caveat emptor. The first of these is
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from asserting an implied warranty that the premises were to be habita-
ble either at the commencement of the lease or at any point thereafter. 10
In 1969, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck a severe blow
to the strict application of property law to lease agreements and to the
well illustrated by the case of Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
The Smith court considered the following question:
Whether ... a person who lets a house must be taken to let it under the implied
condition that it is in a state fit for decent and comfortable habitation, and whether
he is at liberty to throw it up when he makes the discovery that it is not so.
In answering this question in favor of the tenant the court stated, "that if the demised
premise are encumbered with a nuisance of so serious a nature that no person can
reasonably be expected to live in them, the tenant is at liberty to throw them up."
Thus an implied warranty of habitability was imposed on the landlord where he had
let a furnished house for a short term. It is interesting to note that while the fact
situation of this case did involve a short term lease of furnished premises, the court
did not appear to limit the warranty to the fact situation it was dealing with. The
limitation therefore appears to be the product of subsequent authorities rather than
the case itself. The rationale given in the line of cases following this exception is
that the tenant has not had time to inspect the premises and put them in a livable
condition. See Young v. Povich, 121 Me 141 116 A. 26 (1922) ; Hacker v. Nitschke,
310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1944) ; Ingalis v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286
(1892). All of these cases involve furnished premises let for a "short" term which,
upon occupation by the tenants, were found to be uninhabitable. The Ingalls court
pinpointed the reasoning behind the warranty in this fact situation by stating:
But there are good reasons why a different rule should apply to one who hires
a furnished room . . . for a few days or a few weeks or months. Its fitness for
immediate use of a particular kind, as indicated by its appointments, is a far more
important element entering into the contract than where there is a mere lease of
real estate. One who lets for a short term a house provided with all furnishings
and appointments for immediate residence may be supposed to contract with
reference to a well-understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation. An
important part of what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to enjoy it without
delay, and without the expense of preparing it for use. It is very difficult, and
often impossible, for one to determine on inspection whether the house and its
appointments are fit for the use for which they are immediately wanted, and the
doctrine caveat emptor, which is ordinarily applicable to a lessee of real estate,
would often work injustice if applied to cause of this kind.
The second exception arose in the situation where the lease restricted the
tenant to a particular use and an agreement was reached before construction of the
premises was completed. The rationale given was the tenant did not have an oppor-
tunity to inspect when the lease was executed. See Woolford v. Electric Appliances,
Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938) ; Hardman Estate v. McNair, 61 Wash.
74, 111 P. 1059 (1910). In the Woolford case the premises demised were to be used
as a meat market, and the lease called for the landlord to supply the needed refrigera-
tion facilities. Upon his failure to do so the tenant brought suit, and the court, denying
the applicability of caveat emptor stated:
The fixtures and appliances mentioned in the lease were not installed in the
building at the time of the execution thereof. No opportunity was afforded to
the lessee to inspect the same prior to the execution of the lease. Thus, the rule
of caveat emptor as applied to structures already in existence had and has no
application to the questions here presented.
10. See, e.g., Warner v. Fry, 360 Mo. 496, 228 S.W.2d 729 (1950); Fowler v.
Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (1809). See also Comment, The Indigent Tenant and the Doctrine
of Constructive Eviction, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 461; Lesar, Landlord and Tenant
Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279 (1960).
After the tenant had taken possession of the property, he had no right to
demand that the landlord maintain the premises in a livable condition, as the landlord,
absent a covenant to the contrary, had no duty to make repairs. This rule wasjustified on the basis that the landlord was excluded from the premises during the
lease. However, where the landlord retains control of common facilities such as
stairs and corridors, he is generally held to be responsible for keeping them in good
repair. See Maryland v. Manor Real Estate, 176 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Gladden
v. Walker and Dunlop, 168 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn.
624, 169 A. 912 (1933). In each case the respective courts stated that at common law
there was no duty of the landlord to make repairs during the lease agreement. In
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caveat emptor doctrine. In Reste Realty Corporation v. Cooper," the
tenant entered into a commercial lease whereby the premises let were
to be used as a business office. During the course of the lease the prem-
ises became unfit for its specific use, the tenant vacated, and the landlord
sued for the balance of the term's rent. The court ruled that the unin-
habitability of the leasehold constituted a failure of consideration which
gave rise to the right to vacate. After a thorough reevaluation of the
caveat emptor doctrine,12 the court held that "[p]resent day demands
of fair treatment for tenants with respect to latent defects remediable
by the landlord require imposition on him of an implied warranty against
such defects.""' The scope of the landlord's warranty in Reste was that
the premises be suitable for the leased purposes and conform to local
codes and zoning laws.' 4
Although Reste presented encouragement to the plight of the tenant,
there are certain factors which diminish the value of this case to the resi-
dential lessee. Initially, it must be emphasized that the Reste court limited
the coverage of the warranty to latent defects.'5 The necessary implica-
tion of this position would seem to be that any defect which could be
discoverable by the tenant would not be included within the warranty.
Vital facilities in a state of disrepair are often discoverable upon a super-
ficial inspection by a prospective tenant. However, lessees tend to accept
the premises notwithstanding these defects since they have either failed
general, the tenant's remedy was to either inspect the premises, before reaching an
agreement, with his lessor, or to obtain an express warranty that the premises were
to be habitable. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
11. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
12. 53 N.J. at 451-52, 251 A.2d at 272. The Reste court, in justifying its dis-
regard of caveat emptor, stated:
It is true that as the law of leasing an estate for years developed historically,
no implied warranty or covenant of habitability or fitness for the agreed use was
imposed on the landlord. Because the interest of the lessee was considered
personal property the doctrine of caveat emptor was applied, and in the absence of
an express agreement otherwise, or misrepresentation by the lessor, the tenant
took the premises "as is." . . . Modern social and economic conditions have
produced many variant uses and types of leases, e.g., sales and leaseback trans-
actions, mortgaging of leasehold interests, shopping center leases, long-term
leases. Moreover, an awareness by legislatures of the inequality of bargaining
power between landlord and tenant in many cases, and the need for tenant pro-
tection, has produced remedial tenement house and multiple dwelling statutes....
It has come to be recognized that ordinarily the lessee does not have as much
knowledge of the condition of the premises as the lessor. Building code require-
ments and violations are known or made known to the lessor, not the lessee.
He is in a better position to know of latent defects, structural and otherwise,
in a building which might go unnoticed by a lessee who rarely has sufficient
knowledge or expertise to see or to discover them. A prospective lessee, such
as a small businessman, cannot be expected to know if the plumbing or the wiring
systems are adequate or conform to local codes. Nor should he be expected to
hire experts to advise him. Ordinarily all this information should be considered
readily available to the lessor who in turn can inform the prospective lessee.
These factors have produced persuasive arguments for reevaluation of the caveat
emptor doctrine and, for imposition of an implied warranty that the premises are
suitable for the leased purposes and conform to local codes and zoning laws.
13. 53 N.J. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273.
14. 53 N.J. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272.
15. See note 13 and accompanying text supra for the warranty granted and its
limitation to latent defects.
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to find other facilities due to a housing shortage or because alternate facil-
ities are similarly defective. In this regard the Reste court appears to have
failed to confront the formidable problem of unequal bargaining power
between landlord and tenant.
Another compromising factor in Reste is that the remedy granted
for breach of the warranty is limited to the right of the tenant to vacate. 16
While in accord with the general rule as to the tenant's remedies,'17 the
effect of such a position, although augmenting the grounds upon which
a tenant can vacate, does not broaden the course of action a tenant may
take if he desires to stay on the premises and have the defects repaired.
These factors, plus the commercial setting of Reste,'8 support the con-
clusion that the case afforded minimal assistance to the difficulties en-
countered by the residential tenant.19
16. 53 N.J. at 458, 251 A.2d at 273. The Reste court specifically correlated and
thereby appears to have limited the implied warranty to an actual constructive
eviction by stating:
In our view, therefore, at the present time whenever a tenant's right to vacate
leased premises comes into existence because he is deprived of their beneficial
enjoyment and use on account of acts chargeable to the landlord, it is immaterial
whether the right is expressed in terms of a breach of covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment, or material breach of an implied warranty against latent defects.
53 N.J. at 461, 251 A.2d at 276-77. Thus the Reste court seems to be concerned
with assuring the tenant of the right to remove himself from the premises rather
than giving him a more practical remedy such as having the repairs made and
offsetting the expense incurred against the rent due.
17. Formerly, the only course of action the tenant had when he had been sub-
stantially deprived of the enjoyment of the premises was to employ the remedy of
constructive eviction which constituted a major exception to the independent operation
of covenants in lease agreements. Constructive eviction developed from the covenant
of quiet enjoyment which, at a relatively early date, was implied in all lease agree-
ments. Through a narrow application of this doctrine the tenant was relieved from
liability for rent if the landlord physically prevented possession by the tenant. The
covenant also served as insurance to the tenant that his possession would not be
threatened by third persons claiming title to the land. See Meeker v. Spalsbury,
66 N.J.L. 60, 48 A. 1026 (1901); May v. Levy, 88 N.J.L. 351, 95 A. 999 (1915);
Flemming v. Laskas, 191 App. Div. 374, 181 N.Y.S. 567 (1930); Mulliken v. Brown,
201 App. Div. 860, 192 N.Y.S. 883 (1922) ; Tucker v. DuPuy, 210 Pa. 461, 60 A. 4(1905) ; Schienle v. Eckels, 227 Pa. 305, 76 A. 15 (1910). See generally Annot., 62
A.L.R. 1257 (1929) ; Comment, supra note 10. The landmark case of Dyett v. Pendle-
ton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1926), broadened the doctrine of quiet enjoyment by holding
that acts other than actual ejectment by the landlord could diminish the enjoyment of
the premises and thereby relieve the tenant from the duty of paying rent.
To invoke this remedy, the tenant had to meet two requirements: (1) show
that the landlord had prevented his enjoyment of the premises by acts of a serious
and permanent character; and (2) abandon the premises within a reasonable time
after such acts had taken place. See Two Rector Street Corp. v. Bein, 226 App. Div.
73, 76, 234 N.Y.S. 409, 412 (1929), where it was stated:
A necessary element of a constructive eviction is a surrender by the tenant of the
demised premises. A tenant cannot claim uninhabitability, and at the same time
continue to inhabit. If the tenant remains in occupancy the obligation to pay
rent continues ...
18. 53 N.J. at 448, 251 A.2d at 270. The restriction of the premises to com-
mercial use would seem to at least raise the question whether or not the implied
warranty imposed by the Reste court would also be applicable to a residential lease.
The failure of the Resle court to consider this question would appear to substantially
diminish the value of this case to the residential tenant.
19. An implied warranty of habitability was also imposed in the case of Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). In this case the tenants vacated
the premises after finding them in an uninhabitable condition and brought suit against
the landlord to recover the three months rent which had been paid in advance. The
court, relying on legislation and housing code rules which had imposed certain duties
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The initial issue confronting the court in the instant case was whether
the defendant's argument, contesting the amount of rent due, 20 was directed
solely to the merits of the case, or extended to the jurisdictional issue
as well. 21 Jurisdiction, within the context of New Jersey summary dis-
possess actions, has a special meaning since it only exists in three situa-
tions, provided for by statute.22  Moreover, the statute limits appeals
to the question of whether the lower court had jurisdiction to hear the
case.23 In the instant case jurisdiction would vest only upon proof that the
tenant had held over after a default in the payment of rent.24 The court
emphasized that once jurisdiction has been affirmatively established, ap-
on landlords, disregarded the doctrine of caveat emptor, and found that there was an
implied warranty of habitability in leases. While the tenant's position was substantially
improved by this case, it must be kept in mind that the basis for the implied warranty
was recent legislation, and not the lease itself. Hence the status of tenants in those
areas where no such legislation existed was not improved.
In the case of Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969), the
court determined that the relationship between landlords and tenants was essentially
a contractual one and therefore embraced an implied warranty of habitability and
fitness. As a result the remedies available to the tenant were considerably broadened.
See 51 Hawaii at _, 462 P.2d at 475, wherein it was stated:
By adopting the view that a lease is essentially a contractual relationship...
a more consistent and responsive set of remedies are available for a tenant. They
are the basic contract remedies of damages, reformation, and rescission. These
remedies would give the tenant a wide range of alternatives in seeking to resolve
his alleged grievance.
20. 56 N.J. at -, 265 A.2d at 528. Defendant contended that even though
she had not paid the amount called for in the lease, she did not owe rent since she
had paid for the repairs herself and sent the landlord the difference between the
total amount due and the cost of the repair.
21. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). According to N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A :18-53(1951), as it pertains to the instant case, there can be no jurisdiction until it has first
been demonstrated that the tenant is in default in rent payments pursuant to the
terms of the lease agreement. Once this has been established, there can be no appellate
review on the issue of whether rent was in default, as equitable defenses, such as
defendant's argument that the rent though unpaid, was not owing, are considered to
be meritorious rather than jurisdictional questions and are therefore not appealable.
See Peters v. Kelly, 98 N.J. Super. 441, 237 A.2d 635 (1968).
22. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:18-53 (1951), provides that jurisdiction exists for
removal of a tenant through a summary dispossess action in the following situations:
a. Where such person holds over and continues in possession of all or any
part of the demised premises after the expiration of his term, and after demand
made and written notice given by the landlord or his agent, for delivery of
possession thereof ...
b. Where such person shall hold over after a default in the payment of rent,
pursuant ot the agreement under which the premises are held.
c. Where such person (1) shall be so disorderly as to destroy the peace and
quiet of the other tenants living in said house or the neighborhood, or (2) shall
wilfully destroy, damage, or injure the premises, or (3) shall constantly violate
the landlord's rules and regulations governing said premises, provided, such rules
have been accepted in writing by the tenant or are made part of the lease; or (4)
shall commit any breach or violation of any of the covenants or agreements in
the nature thereof contained in the lease for the premises where a right of
re-entry is reserved in the lease for a violation of such covenants or agreements,
and shall hold over and continue in possession of demised premises or any part
thereof, after the landlord or his agent has caused a written notice of the termi-
nation of said tenancy to be served upon said tenant, and a demand that said tenant
remove from said premises within 3 days from the service of such notice. . ..
23. See note 4 supra for a discussion on the limited appeal available in summary
dispossess actions in New Jersey.
24. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:18-53(b) (1951).
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pellate inquiry ends, 25 thus the district court's basis for taking jurisdic-
tion must be closely scrutinized.2 6 The court, observing that recent New
Jersey cases have held that courts must accept any equitable issue offered
to defeat an action within its jurisdiction,27 felt that no valid reason
could be advanced for carving out an exception to this rule in landlord
dispossession actions. It therefore specifically overruled Peters. The
position taken by the court that equitable as well as legal defenses may
be raised by the tenant to defeat jurisdiction has two significant aspects.
First, it necessarily broadens the statutory definition of default.2 8 As a
result of Marini, not only must the landlord show that the rent was due
and unpaid, he must also show that it was owing. Second, the tenant's
ability to defend himself in dispossession actions is tremendously ex-
panded since most lessee defenses are couched in equitable doctrines. The
holding of the court on this point is important not so much for its logical
propriety as for its impact, since it radically reallocates the parties' bur-
dens of proof. This readjustment can be justified on the grounds that
it tends to create equilibrium between the adversaries, which, though
perhaps contrary to the original purpose for dispossession statutes, 29 is
necessitated by the present urban housing shortage.
After the jurisdictional basis for appeal had been established, the
court turned to the question of whether there could exist an implied
warranty within the lease which required the landlord to make repairs
after the commencement of possession by the tenant. The court initially
determined that property doctrines which have traditionally controlled
leases are no longer suitable to govern the legal effects of those instru-
ments. To justify this disregard of property law, the court emphasized
two points: (1) the use of the doctrine of caveat emptor is simply in-
apposite when viewed in the context of modern urban dwellings; and (2)
that caveat emptor should be disregarded 0 because of the tenant's sub-
ordinate bargaining position and the landlord's superior knowledge of
the premises. To fill the void created by its abolition of traditional doc-
trines the Marini court ruled that leases were to be interpreted by con-
25. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:18-59 (1951). For full text of the act, see note 2
and accompanying text supra.26. 56 N.J. at - 265 A.2d at 530, citing Schuyler v. Trefren, 26 N.J.L. 213(Sup. Ct. 1857), wherein it was stated:The proceeding is summary, and the jurisdiction is special, limited and statu-tory; and every essential to its proper exercise must appear to have been com-
plied with.The court used this case to justify its close scrutiny of the jurisdictional prerequisites.What the court failed to realize is that its ruling vitiated the summary nature of
the proceeding.
27. 56 N.J. at __ 265 A.2d at 531.
28. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:18-53(b) (1951). For pertinent text of the act, see
note 1 supra.
29. The original purpose of the dispossession statute, as stated in note 4 supra
was to afford the landlord speedy recovery of possession.30. The Marini court relied on Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251A.2d 268 (1969), for additional support that caveat emptor was not applicable to lease
agreements in today's urban society. See note 12 and accompanying text supra for
the relevant language of the Reste court on this issue.
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tract law. Basically, the court's rationale was that a rule of functionality
should obtain in the construction of such lease arrangements. Since
leases are, at present, predominantly contractual, 3 ' the rules used in their
interpretation should be of similar genesis. The propriety of such rea-
soning cannot be seriously questioned. Indeed, a functional approach was
most probably the premise which gave rise to the rule Marini discarded.8 2
Seen in this light, the court was advancing the proposition that the vital-
ity of the common law depends upon its ability to reflect contemporary
community values and expectations.33
In addition, the court placed emphasis on Reste, which also deter-
mined that caveat emptor was not applicable in the modern lease agree-
ment. A distinction can be drawn, however, between Reste and Marini
since the former, although recognizing that strong arguments exist for
the application of contract principles to lease agreements, was primarily
concerned with a tenant's right to vacate uninhabitable premises. Pre-
occupation with this goal caused the Reste court to evade the question of
what rule of law should apply to lease agreements. Since Reste did not
definitively establish that contract law was the proper methodological
solution to problems arising from landlord-tenant arrangements, 4 the
Marini court's use of Reste for the proposition that contract law governs
was, it is submitted, somewhat misplaced. Perhaps Reste can best be
seen as a precursor to the position that was adopted by the court in the
instant case.85
Looking at the lease as a contract, the court noted that there was
no express covenant to repair, and hence was faced with the question
on which there was no precise decisional precedent - whether an im-
plied covenant arises from a lease for a residential dwelling.
The first step in this analysis was to ascertain the intent of the parties
to the lease. Turning to the provisions of the instrument, the court
31. See 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTs § 890A (3d ed. 1962).
32. Originally the tenant was considered to be a purchaser of an interest in
land and therefore the tenant was subject to the doctrine of caveat emptor. See 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
33. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
34. In the instant case the court, through Reste, stressed the existing unequal
bargaining position between landlords and tenants. The implication from this use of
the Reste case is that inequitable results were often attained because of the unequal
bargaining position. The Marini court therefore substituted contract principles for
property doctrines in an effort to realign the bargaining relationship of the parties to
the lease agreement. Thus it is probably more accurate to say that the Marini court
relied on Reste to show a need for change rather than actual authority for application
of contract principles to lease instruments.
35. That Reste is a precursor of Marini is supported by n.1 at 462 in the opinion:
Where the facts warrant the conclusion that the landlord has breached any de-
pendent covenant of the lease . . . or an implied warranty against latent defects
in such a manner as to warrant vacation of the premises by the tenant but the
tenant is willing to remain in possession and pay a sum representing their reason-
able rental value in their defective or reduced-value condition, should he not be
entitled to do so for the remainder of the term and to have the court fix the
reasonable rental value for that period, or in the alternative have the defective
condition repaired or remedied himself and offset the cost against the rent fixed
in the lease. ...
53 N.J. at 462 n.1, 251 A.2d at 277-78 n.1.
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took the position that the primary purpose for which the parties entered
into the agreement was that the premises be used for "dwelling." Con-
sistent with this purpose, it was felt that a presumption arises that the
parties, as reasonable men, would have agreed that premises let for such
purposes would be fit for habitation, since quarters suitable for living
purposes are the object and very essence of the agreement. 36 Further-
more, the landlord, by marketing the facilities as residential premises,
represents that the apartment is livable, and, therefore, an implied war-
ranty of habitability arises in a lease agreement where the premises are
let for residential purposes.8 7
The obligation imposed on the landlord as a result of the instant
case is that:
[T]here are no latent defects in facilities vital to the use of the
premises for residential purposes because of faulty original con-
struction or deterioration from age or normal usage. And further
it is a covenant that these facilities will remain in usable condition
during the entire term of the lease. In performance of this covenant
the landlord is required to maintain those facilities in a condition
which renders the property livable.,
It can be argued that the limitation of the warranty to latent defects
strips the case of much of its vitality. If this qualification is given a literal
interpretation, the liability imposed by the Marini court may prove
worthless if the defective conditions of the premises let are obvious.
However, such an interpretation fails to consider severe housing short-
ages and consequential unequal bargaining positions between landlords
and tenants. A tenable resolution of the problem is that the term latent
should not be applied literally. The arguments in support of this con-
struction are that a rigid or literal application would be inconsistent with
the thrust of the opinion which is to augment the tenants' legal position
vis-A-vis the landlord. Second, in view of the urban housing shortage,
unjustifiable results could obtain if a warranty extended to hidden de-
fects but was unavailable when the defects were discoverable. Third,
failure to grant relief where defects are obvious would seem inconsistent
with the strong denunciations of the caveat emptor doctrine found in
Reste and Marini. In short, if a literal construction results, the instant
case will have done little to alter landlord-tenant relationships.
Next, the court delineated the rights and duties of the respective
parties. It was observed that traditionally, the respective duties of land-
lords and tenants were treated as independent covenants thus, upon
the landlord's failure to perform according to the terms of the agreement,
the tenant was not relieved of his duty to pay rent.89 His only remedy
36. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526, 533 (1970).
37. 56 N.J. at , 265 A.2d at 534.
38. 56 N.J. at , 265 A.2d at 534.
39. Another consequence of the application of property law to the lease agreement
was the doctrine of independent covenants whereby the tenant was not relieved of his
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was to bring an independent action against the landlord for breach of
covenant. To alleviate this situation, the court ruled that the lessor's
implied covenant of habitability and the tenant's agreement to pay rent
were mutually dependent covenants.4 0  This concept was justified by
reliance upon Higgins v. Whiting which concluded that:
where the acts or covenants of the parties are concurrent, and to
be done or performed at the same time, the covenants are dependent,
and neither party can maintain an action against the other without
averring and proving performance on his part.
41
duty to pay rent if the landlord failed to perform his obligations in accordance with
the terms of the lease. See Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal. App. 2d 54, 179 P.2d 41 (1947) ;
Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938) ; Slovak Catholic Sokol, Inc.
v. Ryff, 17 N.J. Misc. 82, 4 A.2d 849 (Dist. Ct. 1939); 165 West 46th St. Corp. v.
R.K.O. Vaudeville Exchange, Inc., 157 Misc. 716, 285 N.Y.S. 373 (New York City
Ct. 1935) ; DeRosa v. Tucker, 81 N.Y.S.2d 224 (New York Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Siddal
v. Burke, Del. Co. Rep. 530 (Delaware County C.P. 1940); Mitchell v. Weiss, 26
S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). In these cases the landlords had specifically
covenanted to make repairs. Upon their failure to perform, the tenants had stopped
paying rent, and the courts unanimously held that the landlord's performance of their
covenant to repair was not a condition precedent to the tenant's obligation to pay rent.
Thus, the law appears to have placed the tenant in a rather unenviable position since
initially it was very difficult to obtain a covenant that the premises would be main-
tained in a livable condition, and secondly, in the unlikely event that the tenant was
able to obtain such a promise, the fact that he was unable to bring immediate and
direct pressure to bear on the landlord to uphold his end of the bargain (through
non-payment of rent), substantially reduced the value of obtaining the covenant to
repair. See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 446 (1958) ; Schoshinski, Remedies of the
Indigent Tenant: Proposal For Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1965); Lesar, Landlord
and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279 (1960); Comment, supra note 10;
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952). Accordingly, the tenant's
remedy was to maintain an independent action for damages against the landlord.
See generally Noble v. Tweedy, 90 Cal. App. 2d 738, 203 P.2d 778 (1949) ; Electronic
Corp. of America v. Famous Realty, Inc., 275 App. Div. 717, 87 N.Y.S.2d 169, aff'd,
275 App. Div. 859, 89 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Sun Ray Drug Co. v. Lawler,
366 Pa. 571, 79 A.2d 262 (1951); Mitchell v. Weiss, 26 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1930).
Thus the rules pertaining to bilateral contracts in a situation where the con-
ditions of each party are to be performed concurrently, failure by one party to
perform, regardless of whether or not he is at fault, constitutes the failure of con-
sideration and relieves the other party of his duty to perform. Friedlander v. Gross,
63 N.J. Super. 470, 164 A.2d 761 (1960); Disney v. Diffenderffer, 323 Pa. 337, 185
A. 830 (1936) ; 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 814 (3d ed. 1962). Contract principles,
however, traditionally were not applied to lease instruments notwithstanding the
contractual nature of the document. See Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1960), where typical lease provisions are given:
[C]ovenants forbidding assignments by the lessee without consent of the lessor,
concerning the erection and removal of improvements, placing limitations on the
use of the premises granted or the land retained by the lessor, concerning the time
and manner of paying rent, regarding repairs and destruction of the premises,
fixing or apportioning liability for insurance and taxes, and providing for security
deposits and options to purchase and renew.
Lesar argues that since these provisions are contractual in nature, contract rather
than property rules should be applied to the lease agreement.
To further justify the operation of their covenants as mutually dependent,
the Marini court pointed out that through the remedy of constructive eviction, the
tenant was relieved of his duty to pay rent when he had been substantially deprived
of the enjoyment of his premises. Thus, precedent existed for the holding that cove-
nants in lease agreements are mutually dependent.
40. 56 N.J. at _, 265 A.2d at 534.
41. 102 N.J.L. 279, 280, 131 A. 879, 886 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
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The court also emphasized that the tenant's agreement to pay rent prac-
tically appeared to be dependent upon the landlord's promises to provide
essential services such as heat, plumbing, and electricity. 42
In attempting to clarify the parameters of the landlord's duty, it was
said that "[t]he nature of the vital facilities and type of maintenance and
repair required is limited and governed by the type of property rented
and the amount of rent reserved. '48 If such language is given undue
breadth, it could negate any assistance the tenant might expect from the
warranty imposed by the Marini court. Undoubtedly, this language will
be emphasized by landlords and will cause great consternation to the
courts. It is submitted that this language, insofar as it permits dilution
of the court's protection, is inconsistent with the holding of the instant
case and thus should be given a circumscribed interpretation. The court
clearly stated that the warranty covered vital facilities. Patently, there is
no logical nexus between the amount of rent paid and the essential nature
of the facility as construed by the court. 44 However modest the rental
payment may be, it could not serve to mitigate the landlord's responsi-
bility with respect to plumbing, heating, electricity, and other basic neces-
sities and still be consistent with Marini.
Finally, the court recognized that the remedy of constructive evic-
tion was largely inadequate in light of the housing shortage in today's
urban society, and therefore awarded the tenant the alternative of repair-
ing the defective facilities 45 and offsetting the cost of such repairs against
the rent due. This position, however, was qualified by the stipulation that
before the tenant was permitted to proceed on his own, he was to make a
good faith effort to notify the landlord and give him the opportunity to
remedy the situation himself. The landlord's failure to act, or the tenant's
inability to contact him is therefore an essential prerequisite to the
tenant's right to make the repairs himself. The court emphasized that the
landlord's failure to act does not give the right to withhold rent,46 and
specifically limited the tenant's course of action to two alternatives, vaca-
tion or repair. The refusal of the court to allow any abatement in rent
is acceptable because the remedy of repair works toward the positive
social goal of providing adequate housing. From this point of view,
allowing an abatement in rent would be a negative factor since it would
42. 56 N.J. at -, 265 A.2d at 535.
43. 56 N.J. at ., 265 A.2d at 534.
44. The point to be emphasized here is that vital facilities such as plumbing must
function properly or the protection afforded by the instant case is of little value to
the tenant.
45. 56 N.J. at _, 265 A.2d at 535.
46. The Marini court also suggested that the defendant may be required to deposit
the amount of rent which the landlord alleges is owing if the trial is delayed. The
problem arising out of such a statement is that many tenants who are living in
premises in which the "vital facilities" are in a state of disrepair will be prohibited
from incurring the initial cost of repair (assuming the landlord fails to remedy the
situation) because the tenant will in effect be required to pay the total amount of
rent plus the cost of repair at least temporarily. It would therefore appear that those
for whom the warranty was intended to benefit would be deprived therefrom if such
an "escrow" requirement were implemented.
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tend to discourage restoration of the facilities. One important result of
the court's expansion of remedies is that a lease is now an instrument
which is self-sufficient in terms of providing an adequate safeguard to
the tenant which heretofore had been denied him because of the caveat
emptor doctrine. Therefore, it is no longer necessary for tenants to rely
on the substituted and often ineffective protection which legislatures have
attempted to provide through housing codes.
Perhaps the Marini case can be best appreciated through analogy
to a typical sales situation 47 where the seller is held to warrant that the
product sold is fit for the purposes for which such goods are used. The
instant case has imposed a similar standard on the landlord by ruling
that his product - the residential premises - must be fit for the pur-
poses for which it will be used - inhabitation. There appears to be no
substantial reason why a landlord should not be held to the same standard
as a "seller" since they both place "goods" on the commercial market.
The validity of this analogy is supported by the case of Schipper v. Levitt
& Sons. 48 The Schipper court, in applying the implied warranty doctrine
to the sale of a residential premise, quoted Carpenter v. Donohoe49 where
it was held that:
[T]he implied warranty doctrine is extended to include agreements
between builder-vendors and purchasers for the sale of newly con-
structed buildings, completed at the time of contracting .
Where, as here, a home is the subject of a sale, there are implied
warranties that the home was built in workmanlike manner and is
suitable for habitation.
In so ruling, the Schipper court discarded the doctrine of caveat emptor,
reasoning that the application of that concept "disregards the realities of
47. Although the courts have consistently adhered to the application of property
doctrines in the area of residential leases, there has been a considerable extension of
contract principles into other areas of consumer protection. The result of such an
extension has been to compel the seller to put only those goods on the market which
are reasonably fit for the purposes for which they are used. The UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-314, states that the seller warrants (unless he specifically provides
to the contrary) that the goods sold are fit for the ordinary purposes for which they
are used. Section 2-314, provides in pertinent part, that:
[A] warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as ....
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
This standard is enforced through the application of an implied warranty that the
goods are marketable, and upon its breach, the seller must answer to the buyer for any
damages the latter may incur as a result of the breach of warranty. Although the
implied warranty referred to is found in the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314,
and its application appears to be limited in scope to the vendor-purchaser relationship,
it has been extended to other areas.
The proposition that the implied warranty should not be narrowly interpreted
and thereby limited in application to sales situations finds support in the comment
following section 2-313 of the Code. The comment provides, in pertinent part, that:
[T]he warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb
those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not
be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties of such a contract.
48. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
49. 388 P.2d 390, 402 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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the situation,"5' 0 and that it would be inappropriate to adhere to such a
rule since it developed when the parties were in an equal bargaining
position and could therefore be expected to protect themselves. It is sur-
prising that the Marini court did not rely upon Schipper to support its
disregard of the caveat emptor doctrine, for historically, the justification
for applying caveat emptor to the landlord-tenant relationship was that
the lease was considered a sale for a term of years.5'
Moreover, before Marini, Schipper created an anomalous situation
in New Jersey law. The purchaser of a home, who had both title and
a manifest interest in the maintenance of the premises, was granted a
warranty enforceable against his seller whereas the tenant, who had no
such interests, was given no protection. In this context, Marini can be
seen as a grant of equal protection against defects to both classes of
dwellers.
The holding in Marini that the landlord warrants that the vital
facilities of the premises will remain in usable condition during the entire
term of the lease is strikingly similar to another significant New Jersey
case. In Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service,52 the court
held that an agreement to lease delivery trucks gave rise to a "continuing
implied promissory warranty"5 3 that the equipment would be fit for the
lessee's use for the duration of the lease. In determining that this war-
ranty should not be limited to sales situations, the Cintrone court rea-
soned that warranties are regarded by law as an incident of a transaction
because one party to the relationship is in a better position to know and
control the condition of the item transferred and to distribute losses which
may occur. In further support of this proposition the court concluded
that by means of a lease, parties can often reach the same business ends
that can be achieved by selling and buying. The court stated that:
The goods come to the user for the time being and he benefits by
their use and enjoyment without the burdens of becoming and re-
maining the owner. The owner-lessor benefits by receiving the rent
for the temporary use. 54
Although not cited by the court in the instant case, the arguments
advanced in Cintrone appear to apply with equal force to the Marini situa-
tion. The duration of the protection in each case is identical. Moreover, in
each situation the lessor is in a better position to know and control the con-
dition of the property since he has both ownership and familiarity with its
condition. Finally, the primary goal of the residential lease is to provide
housing. Either a sale or a lease of the premises can accomplish this end
since each transaction transfers possession in exchange for a price. It is sub-
mitted that, relying solely upon Cintrone, the court could have made out
50. 44 N.J. at 93, 207 A.2d at 326.
51. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
52. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
53. 45 N.J. at 456, 212 A.2d at 778.
54. 45 N.J. at 447, 212 A.2d at 776.
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a prima facie case for the application of a warranty in residential lease
agreements.5  It may be contended, however, that it is inapposite to
compare Cintrone with Marini since the former involved a lease in per-
sonalty while the latter dealt with a lease in real property. A legitimate
counter argument would be that one of the major accomplishments of
the Marini and Reste cases has been their rejection of traditional prop-
erty doctrines in real estate leases and therefore, no distinction should
be made between leases in real property and leases in personalty.
In conclusion, the Marini court appears to have made a significant
improvement in the tenant's situation with respect to his quest for better
housing. However, the efficacy of the holding presupposes a realistic and
equitable interpretation of the court's position. If, however, courts give
undue breadth to the phrase "latent defects"'5 6 and pay heed to the lan-
guage which intimates that the standard imposed by the warranty will
vary directly the amount of rent paid,5 7 the value of the holding will
be jeopardized.
Robert W. Mahoney
55. It could be argued, however, that Cintrone and Marini are distinguishable on
their facts and therefore should not be compared. In Cintrone, the lessor had specific-
ally promised to maintain the trucks during the lease period. There was no such
promise made by the landlord in Marini. Personal injuries were suffered in Cintrone
and were not in Marini. Finally, the court in Cintrone stated that a major reason for
imposing such a warranty on the lessor was that trucks, in defective condition, are
unreasonably dangerous.
56. 56 N.J. at .., 265 A.2d at 534.
57. 56 N.J. at . 265 A.2d at 534.
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